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TEN ADVERSE OUTCOMES 
WHEN MANAGERS FOCUS ON 
CREATING SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE: A REVIEW
RESUMEN
Esta monografía examina la literatura que critica la 
gestión de negocios orientada a crear valor para los 
accionistas exclusivamente, por la vía de la maximización 
de los precios de sus acciones. Con base en un enfoque 
multidisciplinario, se revisan investigaciones empíricas 
y teóricas de campos como el derecho corporativo, 
la administración, las finanzas, economía, la ética 
empresarial, psicología social y la sociología de las 
organizaciones. Se destacan diez principales efectos 
perjudiciales de la adopción del paradigma del valor 
para el accionista en la administración de empresas. Se 
contribuye con la literatura,adicionalmente, presentando 
evidencia anecdótica a través de casos breves de negocios 
que ilustran estos resultados adversos. En conjunto, esta 
creciente literatura proporciona evidencia convincente 
de que gobernar las compañías para maximizar los 
precios actuales de sus acciones podría tener severas 
consecuencias negativas para todos los constituyentes 
corporativos, incluida la sociedad civil y los propios 
accionistas. 
Palabras clave: Maximización del valor del accionista, 
gobierno corporativo, cortoplacismo, propósito
empresarial.
ABSTRACT
This paper surveys the literature criticizing the view 
that managers should run companies aiming to create 
shareholder value by maximizing stock prices. Based 
on a multidisciplinary approach, I include empirical and 
theoretical papers from fields such as corporate law, 
management, finance, economics, business ethics, social 
psychology, and sociology of organizations. Ten main 
harmful effects from the adoption of the shareholder 
value paradigm stand out. I also add to the literature 
by presenting anecdotal evidence through short 
business cases illustrating these adverse outcomes. 
Together, this growing literature provides compelling 
evidence that governing companies in order to maximize 
current stock prices might lead to severe negative 
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1 Source: Drucker. P. 2008. The Essential Drucker: The Best of Sixty 
Years of Peter Drucker's Essential Writings on Management. 
HarperBusiness. Chapter 6.
2 The term “managers” in this paper encompasses both c-level 
officers as well as board members. 
3 The corporate governance movement and the shareholder value 
approach to business, in turn, were strongly grounded on agency 
theory formulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The adoption of 
agency theory as the basis for management education on corporate 
governance contributed to the creation of the shareholder value 
paradigm and to its diffusion among market practitioners.
4 The term “shareholder value” has been used to refer to concepts such 
as that: 1) managers should make decisions aiming to maximize 
shareholders’ claims through increases in stock prices and cash 
distributions; 2) the best measure of the firm’s value to stockholders 
is given by its market capitalization on stock markets; or, 3) 
managers should only approve investments if their expected 
return outperforms the cost of capital of the firm. Rappaport 
(1986) has introduced the use of “shareholder value” as a managerial 
tool in the 1980s (“The ultimate test of corporate strategy, 
the only reliable measure, is whether it creates economic value 
for shareholders”). In this paper, I refer to shareholder value 
maximization as the managerial practices and strategies intended 
to maximize stock prices. 
5 Since the economic concept of “value” depends on the net present 
value of future cash flows available for financial claimants in an 
undefined period of time, the paradigm of maximizing shareholder 
value could be understood, in theory, from the perspective of 
making stockholders as rich as possible in the long run. In practice, 
though, the doctrine has been translated into the frantic search 
for maximizing current stock prices. To illustrate this point, the 
average holding period of stocks from companies belonging to the 
S&P 500 index fell from eight years in 1960 to around four months 
in 2013. In addition, the average tenure of CEOs from listed companies 
has also been halved in the U.S. since the 1970s (details ahead in 
the paper). Both investors and executives, therefore, are more and 
more oriented towards short-term results. It is also important to 
note that the idea that managers should create shareholder value 
through the maximization of stock prices is fully dependent on 
the informational efficiency of stock markets. Source of data: 
The Purpose of the Corporation Project (http://www.purposeof
corporation.org/cs).
6 The view that shareholder wealth maximization was the only 
proper goal of corporate governance was considered a settled 
issue in the late 1990s. Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) statement 
illustrate this in their widely-cited article: “there is no longer any 
serious competitor to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value. The 
principal elements of this emerging consensus are that ultimate 
control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder 
class; the managers of the corporation should be charged with 
the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its 
shareholders… and the market value of the publicly traded 
corporation’s shares is the principal measure of its shareholders’ 
interests”. Stout (2012) summarizes the prevalence of this view: 
“Most scholars, regulators and business leaders accepted without 
question. Shareholder primacy had become dogma, a belief 
system that was rarely questioned, seldom explicitly justified, 
and had become so pervasive that many of its followers could not
even recall where or how they had first learned of it” (p. 21).
consequences for all corporate constituencies, including 
society and shareholders themselves.
Key-Words: shareholder value maximization, corporate 
governance, “short-termism”, company purpose, survey.
JEL Classification Codes: G30, G32, G34, K22, L21, M14, 
M19, M20.
1. INTRODUCTION
“The social universe has no “natural laws” ... This means 
that assumptions that were valid yesterday can become 
invalid and, indeed, totally misleading in no time at all”.
Peter Drucker (1909-2005) 1.
The corporate governance movement has been strongly 
grounded on the view that managers 2 primarily role is to 
create shareholder value, since its inception in the 1980s3.
Although the term “shareholder value” is interpreted in 
different ways 4, this paradigm asserts that a well-governed 
company is one in which managers seek to maximize 
stockholders’ wealth, as measured by its stock price 5.  
The orientation to maximize shareholder value has 
become the (explicit or implicit) basis for several 
codes of best practices, as well as for the approval of 
regulations aiming at strengthening shareholder 
rights and investors’ activism 6.  As a result, listed 
companies worldwide during the past three decades 
have been urged to change their governance 
structures in order to “unleash” higher shareholder 
value by:
• Increasing the number of independent directors in 
order to enhance board independence;
• Implementing equity-based compensation;
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• Dismantling most anti-takeover devices to facilitate the 
market for corporate control 7;
• Promoting greater convergence of control rights and 
cash flow rights through the increased adoption of the one 
share-one vote rule; and, 
• Facilitating shareholder activism through statutory modi-
fications and friendly procedures at shareholder meetings.
In spite of all these relevant changes, though, few would 
say that the corporate governance movement has ma-
naged to turn corporations around the world into more 
genuinely accountable, responsible, transparent and 
sustainable organizations in the past decades. 
Possibly on the contrary. During this period, successive 
scandals and crises have characterized the business en-
vironment. In the U.S. market, for instance, the 2000s was 
marked by the wave of accounting frauds in 2001-2002, the 
stock option backdating scandal in 2005 8,  and the collapse 
of systemically critical financial institutions that caused the 
2008 global financial crisis. 
In addition, major scandals involving the payment of large
-scale bribes (e.g. Siemens in 2006 9, and Alstom in 2011 10); 
money laundering (e.g. Olympus in 201111,  HSBC in 2012 12,
Commerbank in 2015 13); siphoning of funds to political 
parties (e.g. Petrobras in 2014 14) , and ecological disasters 
motivated by bad governance practices (e.g. BP in 2010 15),
have eroded the trust in business worldwide.
In this sense, a survey conducted by the Edelman Institute 
in 2013, with 30,000 people from around the world, found 
that only 18% believe that business leaders are trustable to 
tell the truth and reliable to make ethical decisions 16. Two 
other polls carried out by the Gallup Institute in the U.S. 
reinforce this conclusion. The first shows that the public 
satisfaction with the size and influence of major corporations 
reached a record low of 30% in 2012, against 50% ten years 
before 17. The second shows that only 21% of the population 
demonstrate a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in big 
business as an institution in 2014 18. 
For a growing number of scholars from different fields, 
such as corporate law (Stout, 2002, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 
2013, 2014; Masouros, 2012; Armour and Gordon, 2014; 
Sjåfjell and Mähönen, 2014), management (Martin, 2010, 
2011; Mayer, 2013), economics (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
2000; Lazonick, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011), political 
economy (Pearlstein, 2014), finance (Montier, 2014), 
business ethics (Palazzo et al. 2012; Gonin et al. 2012), 
and sociology  of organizations (Finglestein, 2001; 
Finglestein and Shin, 2004, 2007; Jung, 2015; Tomaskovic-
Devey et al. 2015), the root of the problem stems from 
the adoption of shareholder value as the guiding 
principle for the corporate governance movement19. Even 
conservative and pro-business publications, such as 
the Financial Times, have started to question the cult 
to shareholder value. Martin Wolf, its chief economics 
commentator, stated in 2014 that “almost nothing in 
economics is more important than thinking through 
how companies should be managed and for what ends. 
Unfortunately, we have made a mess of this. That mess 
has a name: it is shareholder value maximization” 20.  
These critics argue that the managerial focus on shareholder 
7 Given the dismantling of most anti-takeover devices, the 
boosting of stock prices has been seen by managers as one of 
the best defense against a hostile takeover.
8 In 2005, a paper by Lie (2005) showed that around 2,000 U.S. 
companies have altered the date in which stock option plans were 
granted to its executives to dates immediately before sharp increases 
in stock prices. This practice increased substantially managers’ 
compensation, leading to a SEC investigation. More than 130 
companies have been identified as practicing improper backdating, 
resulting in the firing or resignation of more than 50 top managers. 
9 See New York Times. At Siemens, bribery was just a line item. Dec 
20th 2008. 
10 See New York Times. Alsom to plead guilty and pay U.S. a US$772 
million fine in a bribery scheme.
11 See Bloomberg Businessweek. The Story Behind the Olympus 
Scandal. Feb 16th 2012.
12 See Bloomberg. HSBC Judge Approves $1.9B Drug-Money 
Laundering Accord. Jul 3rd 2013. 
13 See Financial Times. Commerzbank makes $1.45bn settlement 
with US. Mar 12th 2015. 
14 See Financial Times. Petrobras scandal knocks broader Brazilian 
oil industry. Mar 25th 2015.
15 See Reuters. U.S. judge upholds BP 'gross negligence' Gulf spill 
ruling. Nov 13th 2014.
16 Edelman trustbarometer 2013. Annual Global Study. Available 
at http://www.edelman.com/insights/intellectual-property/
trust-2013/ 
17 Americans Anti-Big Business, Big Gov’t 2012. Available at http://www.
gallup.com/poll/152096/americans-anti-big-business-big-gov.aspx  
18 Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx 
19 In the case of Armour and Gordon (2014), they propose relaxing 
the mechanisms encouraging shareholder value maximization 
only for companies that might cause systemic harms to society, 
such as large financial institutions. 
20 Martin Wolf. Financial Times. Opportunist shareholders must 
embrace commitment. August 26th 2014. Available at http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/6aa87b9a-2d05-11e4-911b-00144feabdc0.html 
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value by maximizing stock prices has generated many 
negative side effects for stakeholders and society in general, 
including stockholders themselves. Pearlstein (2014), for 
instance, argue that shareholder value is nothing more 
than an ideology that has become corrupted over time to 
favor a small intellectual elite: “[What] began in the 1970s 
and 1980s as a useful corrective to self-satisfied manage-
rial mediocrity has become a corrupting self-interesting 
dogma peddled by finance professors, Wall Street money 
managers and over-compensated corporate executives” 
(p. 5).
As a result, an increasing theoretical and empirical literature 
criticizing the view that managers should run companies 
aiming to maximize stock prices has emerged 21. Given 
the current relevance of this debate, this paper aims to 
synthetize this literature 22.
I identify ten main negative side effects for stakeholders 
and society resulting from governing companies based on 
the shareholder value paradigm 23:
1. Generation of long-term liabilities to be borne by society;
2. Managerial myopia resulting from the focus on meeting 
analysts’ earnings expectations;
3. Underinvestment as a consequence of the increased 
“financialization”24  of companies;
4. Managerial focus on managing expectations in order to 
maximize equity-based pay;
5. Increased income inequality within firms and at the 
society level;
6. Opportunistic behavior of shareholders seeking 
short-term gains in mergers & acquisitions;
7. Increased job insecurity, stress and lack of purpose in 
the organizational environment;
8. Promotion of amoral behavior and ethical blindness;
9. Deterioration of long-term firm performance; and,
10. Worst long-term outcomes for the capital markets, 
the environment and universal investors.
In the following sections, I detail each one of these 
negative implications, including their rationale and 
empirical evidence. The last section concludes this
 research by integrating all adverse consequences into 
a single framework. 
2. GENERATION OF LONG-TERM LIABILITIES TO BE 
BORNE BY SOCIETY
Society grants stockholders of publicly-held companies the 
privilege of limited liability, a form of subsidy that avoids 
shareholders to bear the full cost of its company’s actions. 
But limited liability can generate a perverse incentive. If 
legal mechanisms, such as regulations, fail to ensure that 
all the firm’s costs are fully internalized by the company, 
then it will be rational for stockholders (especially in the 
case of short-term investors) to pocket the firm’s earnings 
as quickly as possible, while leaving long-term liabilities to 
society. 
This is what happened in the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Executives from financial institutions and many fund 
managers cashed huge gains in the pre-crisis years. 
When the collapse occurred, however, stakeholders and 
society had to bear most of its costs. According to Mayer 
(2013), since shareholders are subject to limited liability, 
it was rational for many investors during this period 
to encourage bank officers to roll the dice in a game 
of “heads I win, tails you lose” 25. 
21 Early literature criticizing shareholder value as a managerial 
paradigm is provided by Aglietta (2000), Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
(2000), Finglestein (2001), and Stout (2002). For Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000), for instance, shareholder value is a term 
emerged under neoliberalism that changed managers’ strategic 
orientation from a philosophy of “retain and reinvest” towards a 
philosophy of “downsize and distribute”.
22 Although the critics in the literature are more closely related 
to large listed companies with dispersed ownership structure 
typically observed in Anglo-Saxon countries, the negative-side 
effects presented may also be present in companies with 
controlling shareholders that are the norm around the world. 
As a result, I provide anecdotal evidence on the pervasiveness of 
such adverse outcomes through short business cases involving 
Brazilian companies.
23 Stout (2013) details another “toxic side effect” (in her words) of 
shareholder primacy: the extraction of shareholder value at the 
expense of creditor’s welfare. This issue is not discussed in this 
paper. 
24 According to Van der Zwan (2014), financialization refers to 
the web of interrelated process – economic, political, social, 
technological, cultural, etc. – through which finance has extended its 
influence beyond its traditional role as provider of capital for the 
productive economy into realms of social life. One of the 
branches in this literature deals with the financialization of the 
modern corporation. In this case, it analyzes the increasing 
financial orientation of non-financial corporations. 
25 According to Mayer (2013, p. 62), highly levered financial 
institutions had a good chance of getting abnormal gains at the cost 
of a very small risk of catastrophic losses. If abnormal gains held for
a sufficiently long period before the occurrence of large losses, then
it would be worth for participants with a short-term time horizon to
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Armour and Gordon (2014) detail the problems of the 
doctrine of shareholder value maximization in relation to 
systemic harms. For them: [The] financial crisis has
demonstrated serious flaws in the corporate governance 
of systemically important financial firms. In particular, the 
norm that managers should seek to maximize shareholder 
value, as measured by the stock price, proves to be a faulty 
guide for managerial action in systemically important 
firms. (p. 35). In particular, the norm that managers should 
seek to maximize shareholder value, as measured by the 
stock price, proves to be a faulty guide for managerial 
action in systemically important firms”. Roe (2014) makes a 
similar argument by pointing out that: [The] basis for
questioning the value of shareholder-oriented financial 
firm governance is straightforward: as long as there is a 
strong too-big-to-fail subsidy, shareholder interests will find it 
profitable to take heavy risk, because a significant fraction 
of the downside is borne by the government or by the overall 
economy, not by the firm and its shareholders. (p. 1454)
Several empirical papers examining the corporate gover-
nance determinants of financial firms’ performance during 
the crisis corroborate the argument that institutions focu-
sed on maximizing stock prices imposed higher economic 
externalities on society. Erkens et al. (2012), for instance, 
analyze 296 financial institutions from 30 countries at the 
epicenter of the crisis. They conclude that firms with more 
independent boards and higher institutional ownership 
experienced worse stock returns during the 2007–2008 
financial crisis. Interestingly, they also note that banks with
higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the 
crisis, suffering larger losses. According to the authors:
A potential explanation for this finding is that indepen-
dent directors and institutional shareholders encouraged 
managers to increase shareholder returns through greater 
risk-taking prior to the crisis. Shareholders may find it 
optimal to increase risk because they do not internalize the 
social costs of financial institution failures. (p. 390)
In line with this conclusion, Beltratti and Stulz (2012)
analyze 164 large banks from 32 countries and find that 
those with more shareholder-friendly boards 26 performed 
significantly worse during the crisis than other financial 
institutions. According to the authors: […] our evidence 
poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor 
bank governance was a major cause of the crisis […] The 
most likely explanation is that shareholder-friendly boards 
positioned banks in ways that they believed maximized 
shareholder wealth, perhaps by taking advantage of 
implicit or explicit governmental guarantees, but left them 
more exposed to risks that manifested themselves during 
the crisis and had an adverse impact on banks. In other 
words, shareholder-friendly boards created more value for 
shareholders through their decisions before the crisis, but 
during the crisis these decisions were associated with poor 
outcomes. (pp. 1-2)
Aebi et al. (2012) find similar results after analyzing 573 U.S. 
financial institutions. Although their focus is to demonstrate 
that banks with more independent risk-management 
departments performed better during the crisis 27, they 
also observe that banks’ performance is negatively related 
to governance mechanisms such as board independence. 
They also highlight that results suggest that “Banks were 
pushed by their boards to maximize shareholder wealth 
before the crisis and thereby took risks that were unders-
tood to create wealth but later turned out poorly in the 
credit crisis” (p. 3215).28
For Mayer (2013), a similar problem is likely to occur with 
companies from other strategically important industries 
that are currently generating potentially explosive future 
liabilities of all sorts (such as those in the environmental, labor 
and social areas). The liabilities of these “too-important-to-
fail” companies 29 will be largely borne by society--not by its 
shareholders--since many of them will no longer be active 
when the problems materialize, while others will simply be 
“play the game”. Bratton and Whatcher (2010) reach the same con-
clusion by arguing that: “For a management dedicated to maximi-
zing shareholder value, the instruction manual was clear: get with 
the program by generating more risky loans and doing so with 
more leverage. Any bank whose managers failed to implement 
the new math of high returns with low beta got stuck with a low 
price… would increased shareholder power have moderated the 
bank’s risky business practices? We think the answer is no” (p. 720).
26 Beltratti and Stulz (2012) used a RiskMetrics governance index 
composed by 25 board attributes to measure the alignment of 
interests between boards and shareholders. 
27 Specifically, they find that banks in which the CRO reports 
directly to the board of directors perform significantly better in the 
credit crisis than those in which the she reports to the CEO.
28 The lack of an expected positive relation between recommen-
ded corporate governance practices and firm performance 
during the crisis has also been observed for non-financial 
companies by Gupta et al. (2013). After analyzing 4,406 public 
companies belonging to a wide range of industries from 22 
countries, they find that companies with higher governance 
quality (measured by a broad-based index), did not out perform 
those with lower scores.
29 This term was created by Mayer (2013).
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not financially capable to cover its costs 30. He concludes 
that: It is perfectly rational for companies anticipating 
potential problems in the future to distribute as much as 
they can to their current shareholders so that there is as 
little as possible in the business to pay out in compensation 
to the victims of the devastation they have caused (p. 66).
3. MANAGERIAL MYOPIA RESULTING FROM 
THE FOCUS ON MEETING ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS 
EXPECTATIONS
The focus on maximizing stock prices usually involves 
devoting much relevance to meet or beat market’s 
quarterly earnings expectations. The managerial effort 
to play the “earnings game”, in turn, may affect the 
behavior of company, leading to reduced investments 
as well as to long-term value destruction. 
Graham et al. (2006) provide startling evidence on how 
managers are willing to alter investment decisions in order 
to meet expected earnings, even if these decisions sacrifice 
long-run economic value and hurt stockholders in the 
long term. After surveying 401 CFOs 31, they observe that 
around 80% would be willing to sacrifice economic value in 
order to smooth earnings 32, while 56% would defer valuable 
long-term projects in order to meet earnings benchmarks 33. 
Around 80% of CFOs also admit they would decrease R&D 
and maintenance expenditures to meet earnings targets, 
even though many acknowledge that these decisions can be 
value destroying.
The fact that a relevant fraction of around 40% of managers 
would clearly reject a positive-NPV project to meet an analyst 
consensus estimate allows for an estimation of the magnitude 
of the problem of having current stock prices guide managerial 
actions. Graham et al. (2006) calculate that a “small sacrifice” 
of 1% of economic value by managers to reach market 
expectations would cost around US$150 billion per year for 
the U.S. economy; this is equivalent of “two Enron scandals”.
The authors also ask CFOs whom they perceive as the most 
important person or group when the company establishes its 
policies on disclosure and earnings recognition. By far, CFOs 
see stock analysts and institutional investors as their most im-
portant audiences. CFOs, therefore, largely see themselves as 
working for short-term money managers and stock analysts 
whom they should please in order to maximize stock prices 34.
Jie and Xuan (2013) also find evidence of negative impacts 
on the real economy arising from managers’ focus on 
pleasing stock markets. After analyzing 25,860 firm-year 
observations from 1993 to 2006 in the U.S., they conclude 
that firms covered by a larger number of analysts generate 
fewer patents as well as patents with lower impact. 
The negative impact of analyst coverage on firm 
innovation35 is consistent with the hypothesis that 
analysts’ pressure on managers to meet short-term 
earnings goals lead them to try to boost earnings per 
share by sacrificing investments in long-term innovative 
projects (especially projects that are highly risky and 
slow in generating revenues) 36. 
Asker et al. (2015) provide further evidence of the deleterious 
consequence of trying to maximize current stock prices. 
30 This problem evidences how shareholders are not the only 
stakeholders to bear residual risks in the companies. Other 
stakeholders are also exposed to risks that they cannot be fully 
protected by contracts or regulations. 
31 Graham et al. (2006) also conducted in-depth interviews with 
an additional 22 executives.
32 In the authors’ words: “We directly asked executives how much 
they would sacrifice to avoid volatile earnings. An astonishing 78 
percent admitted that they would sacrifice a small, moderate, or 
large amount of value to achieve a smooth earnings path” (p. 33).
33 In addition, 15 of 20 executive interviewed in person agreed that 
every company would/should take actions such as the deferral of 
valuable long-term projects in order to deliver earnings even when 
there is not a capital constraint, as long as the actions are within 
GAAP and the real economic sacrifices are not “too large”.
34 Graham et al. (2006, p.38) conclude their paper by saying that 
“our results suggest that capital investment may not be at its 
optimal level because of pressures to play the earnings game. 
Less investment means less employment.  Less investment also 
negatively affects the ability of companies to compete in the 
global economic arena”. 
35 Jie and Xuan (2013) use different variables associated with 
innovation (such as the number of patents granted and the 
number of future citations received by each patent) to assess 
the success of long-term investment in innovation.
36 The “pressure hypothesis” theorizes the relationship between 
analyst coverage and innovation. According to Jie and Xuan (2013), 
“tolerance for failure is necessary for effectively motivating and 
nurturing innovation. However, the least thing financial analysts 
can offer to innovative firms is to tolerate short-term failures, 
as their job is to forecast near-term earnings and make 
corresponding stock recommendations. Whenever they expect 
the firms to experience a drop in near-term earnings, they would 
revise their forecasts downward and make unfavorable recom-
mendations, leading to negative market reactions and potential 
disciplinary actions against the managers” (p. 857).
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They investigate whether public-firm managers behave in 
a short-termist way by comparing the investment behavior 
of comparable public and closely-held private firms of a 
dataset covering more than 400,000 firm-year observations 
over the period from 2001 to 2011 37. They reach two main 
conclusions. First, public firms invest substantially less 
than do private ones 38. For instance, after matching on size 
and industry, public firms increase gross fixed assets by 
3.7% of total assets per year, against the almost double of 
6.8% for private firms 39. This result is even more surprising 
given that public companies, in theory, have access to 
cheaper long-term capital for investments through stock 
markets 40. Second, public firms are much less responsive 
to changes in investment opportunities than private 
ones, especially in industries in which stock prices are 
more sensitive to earnings news as well as in the case of 
companies with high levels of short-term focused institutional 
ownership 41.  
Asker et al. (2015) findings, therefore, are consistent with 
the argument that short-term oriented pressures distort 
investment decisions by inducing public firms to invest 
myopically 42. 
4. UNDERINVESTMENT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE 
INCREASING FINANCIALIZATION OF COMPANIES
For critics, the increased centrality of the financial industry 
and the growing power of money managers proclaiming 
the motto of shareholder value have led companies to 
undergo a process of “financialization” 43. As a consequence, 
non-financial companies 1) increased their activities related 
to financial markets; 2) became more and more focused on
returning cash to shareholders; and 3) were converted
into a portfolio of financial assets that might be bought, 
sold or traded in parts through spin-offs at any time 44.  
The main alleged negative implication from this process 
of financialization is that companies increasingly prioritize 
returning cash to shareholders 45 and allocating funds into 
speculative financial assets 46 instead of investing in 
long-term activities with productive purposes (Krippner, 
2005, 2011; Lazonick, 2008, 2011; Wolfson and Kotz, 2010; 
37 The paper naturally assumes that closely held private firms are 
subject to fewer pressure for short-term results.
38 Authors obtain this result after holding firm size, industry, and 
investment opportunities constant.
39 Asker et al. (2015) use several alternative measures of corporate 
investment obtaining the same results. They show, for example, 
that private firms continue to outinvest public ones when they 
compute investment in intangibles in addition to investments in 
fixed assets. 
Rows 5 and 6 show similar patterns for net (rather than gross) 
investment: private firms invest 2.9 percentage points more in 
net fixed assets and 4.4 percentage points more when we include 
intangibles.
40 This finding is consistent with a model formulated by Ferreira 
et al. (2012). Their model shows that private ownership creates 
incentives for innovation, whereas public ownership disincentivizes 
innovation. As a result, they conclude that the incentives in 
public firms are biased toward conventional projects, whereas the 
incentives in private firms are biased toward innovative projects.
41 Authors show that private firms’ investment decisions are 
around four times more responsive to changes in investment 
opportunities than public firms, even during the 2008 financial 
crisis.
42 There are other examples of the negative impacts for companies 
and society coming from the focus on meeting markets’ earnings 
expectations. In an earlier study, Bushee (1998) finds that a large 
proportion of ownership by institutional investors that have high 
portfolio turnover and engage in momentum trading significantly 
increases the probability that managers reduce R&D in order 
to reverse an earnings decline.  More recently, Benner and 
Ranganathan (2012) find that negative analyst recommendations 
are associated with reductions in firm capital expenditure and 
R&D during times of technological change.  
43 The “financialization” of non-financial companies can be measured 
by the ratio of financial payouts relative to profits as well as by the 
ratio of financial assets as a share of its total assets.
44 According to Blackburn (2006), the financialized firm may be 
called “the disposable corporation” (p. 42). Van der Zwan (2014) 
details the literature investigating the financialization of the 
companies and society in different fields of social sciences, such as 
political economy, sociology and economics.
45 Kliman and Williams (2015) observe that U.S. corporations are 
paying out larger sums of cash to financial markets since the 1980s. 
They observe, for instance, that the share of net operating surplus 
paid out as dividends was relatively stable between 1957 and 1988, 
but then rose almost continually to a level more than double that 
of 1988.
46 For instance, Kliman and Williams (2015) observe that non-
financial U.S. corporations increased their financial assets as a 
share of their total assets from 36% to 56% (a rise of more than 
50%) between 1982 and 2007. In this sense, Stockhammer (2004) 
argues that a fundamental shift in the priorities of corporate 
management that has taken place in the past decades, in which 
corporations have become increasingly rentier-like by using 
heir profits to acquire financial assets instead of productive 
ones.  
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Ott, 2011; Duménil and Lévy, 2011) 47. The case of share 
repurchases 48  in the U.S. market is the clearest example of 
this criticism. Until the early 1990s, these operations were 
relatively rare. Pressured by investors to distribute their 
“surplus” cash in order to keep stock prices at high levels, 
companies started to buyback their shares in increasing 
proportions, exceeding the traditional distribution via 
dividends during the 2000s 49.  
Stocks buybacks reached its apex in 2007, the last year 
prior to the global financial crisis (when stock prices were 
at its highest in the decade). That year, S&P500 companies 
spent about $600 billion to buy back its shares, an incredible 
89% of its aggregate net income. According to Lazonick 
(2011, p.6), from 2000 to 2009, S&P500 companies spent 
$2.5 trillion in buybacks (58% of their net income) and 
additional $1.8 trillion in dividends (41% of their income)50. 
The result from corporations’ increase in payments to 
financial markets is that, on a macro level, companies have 
distributed all their earnings as well as shareholders have 
extracted more money out of public companies in the 
2000 decade in the U.S. than they have put in 51.
Even mainstream publications, such as The Economist 52,
recognize that there are reasons to worry with the massive 
buybacks. It shows that buybacks resumed to the pre-crisis 
level in the past years, reaching US$500 billion in 2013. 
Several companies spent more than 100% of their cash 
flows on dividends and buybacks, while many are making 
use of cheap debt to boost their stock prices. It also 
highlights that in the 2006-2008 period U.S. financial 
institutions repurchased around US$207 billion of their 
shares, only to receive and injection of around US$250 
billion from taxpayers in 2009 to stay afloat. According 
to the publication, while everybody is addicted to the 
temporary pop they give to stock prices, the irrational 
hunger for cash returns may be contributing to a jobless 
and “no-investment” recovery.
In sum, the pressure to keep stock prices at the maximum 
level in order to 1) satisfy investors; 2) defend the company 
against takeovers; and 3) maximize managers’ equity-
based compensation, is making companies increasingly 
repurchasing their shares, which for critics, such as 
Lazonick (2013), tends to stifle the growth of investment in 
innovation 53.
47 This third critic, therefore, also relates with the underinvestment 
resulting from the focus in pleasing market agents. However, in this 
case the problem deals with the allocation of earned income instead 
with the management of earnings in order to meet securities’ analysts.
48 Share repurchases (also known as stock buybacks) are the 
re-acquisition by a company of its own stock. It is another mechanism 
to return money to shareholders.
49 Lazonick (2010) details the empirical evidence of the steady 
increases in dividend and stock buybacks to shareholders in the 
U.S. market since the 1980s. He also makes an important point 
about the distinction between share buy-backs and dividends. 
Whereas share buy-backs involve the sale of stock by investors to 
the corporation, dividend payouts require a continued ownership 
of stock by the investors. For this reason, Lazonick (2010, p.696) 
argues that dividend payouts might actually result in more patient 
capital than generally assumed.
50 In addition to repurchases reaching its apex in the year in which 
stocks peaked in the 2000s, critics argue that many executives 
sold shares from their personal accounts while carrying out re-
purchases on behalf of their companies. Therefore, the argument 
that stock buybacks add value by signaling to the market that the 
company’s shares are undervalued is severely weakened with this 
finding. For evidence on this contradictory behavior, see the “Insider 
Buying Dries Up Defying $275 Billion of buybacks”, Bloomberg, 
09/22/2014, Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-
22/insider-buying-dries-up-defying-275-billion-of-buybacks.html.
51 As Montier (2014) notes, from the mid-1980s onwards, equity is-
suance in the U.S. has been net negative as firms have bought back 
a huge amount of their own equity (often through the issuance of 
debt. He concludes by saying that “far from providing capital to 
the corporate sector, shareholders have been extracting it from 
corporates”.
52 Source: Share buy-backs: the repurchase revolution. Sep 13th 
2014. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/21616968 
53 The view that rising financial payouts have come at the expense 
of productive investment is not consensual, however. Kliman and 
Williams (2015), for instance, argue that the relative increase in the 
financial payments through buybacks and dividends did not lead 
to a decline in productive investment because they were funded 
by increases in debt instead of form operational profits. On the 
other hand, the authors agree with the prior literature on 
financialization that 1) non-financial corporations have become 
increasingly financialized; and 2) financial payouts have increased 
more rapidly than profits since the 1980s. They also observe that 
the rate of capital accumulation plummeted 67% from 1979 to the 
period between 2001 and 2007, while companies substantially 
increased their acquisition of financial assets in relation to their 
acquisition of productive fixed assets.
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5. MANAGERIAL FOCUS ON MANAGING 
EXPECTATIONS IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE 
EQUITY-BASED PAY
Equity-based pay is a key recommendation arising from 
shareholder value ideology (Jensen, 2001; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). However, when compensation schemes 
are excessively tied to stock prices, managers tend to 
concentrate their efforts on managing market expectations 
instead of running their companies in order to create real 
value. Martin (2011) sums up this criticism by saying that 
“expectations are where the money is” (p. 27)54. 
A recent case in Brazil illustrates this problem. Between 
2007 and 2010, high-profile entrepreneur, Eike Batista, 
launched six different companies at the Brazilian stock 
market. The backbone of the conglomerate was OGX, an 
oil firm that raised US$4.1 billion at its strongly demanded 
IPO in June 200855. The company had been created just 
one year before on the promise of great exploration pros-
pects. After announcing several oil discoveries, OGX market 
capitalization peaked around US$40 billion in September 
2010. The company, however, started to fall far short of 
expectations regarding its oil production. It started by 
postponing pumping its first expected oil from 201 to the 
following year. In June 2012, it slashed production guidance 
for its allegedly most valuable oil field. Stock price started 
a downward trend after becoming increasingly clear that 
the company would never produce near expectations 56. 
Earlier in 2013, OGX announced ceasing the production of 
several oil fields, including its most valuable one, because 
they were commercially unviable. On October 30th 2013, 
OGX finally filed for bankruptcy protection under a US$4.1 
billion debt load 57. Its stocks fell 99% while bonds were 
traded at 8% of face value.
The OGX collapse, without generating any positive economic 
value, though, did not prevent its senior executives to 
pocket millions due to equity-based arrangements exercised 
during the brief period in which its shares remained at 
a high level. At least ten senior officers cashed between 
US$35 and US$100 million from compensation schemes 
based on stock-option plans 58, while dozens of others 
lower level executives pocketed between US$1 and US$35 
million. One C-level executive (that was neither the CEO 
or CFO), for instance, cashed around US$55 million during 
the short period of 30 months in which he worked for the 
company 59. Ironically, the Investor Relations officer quit 
the company two months before the most important 
announcement of its history in June 2012, when OGX 
informed the market that its reserves were far smaller 
than expected. He sold all his shares in the two months 
before this announcement, earning around US$60 million 
during his five years’ tenure 60.
A somewhat similar tale on the side effects of equity-based 
pay also occurred with executives from financial institutions 
54 In addition, linking top executives’ pay to stock prices may 
lead to excessive risk-taking and less emphasis on environ-
mental and social aspects in decision-making. Martin (2012) 
provides a deep discussion on this issue.
55 OGX’s were sold at US$ 690 per share at its initial public 
offering, the top of the established price range. Around 50,000 
institutional and retail investors bought OGX stocks (foreign 
institutional investors acquired around two-thirds of the 
shares). At the time, it was the biggest IPO in Brazilian history. 
The company was listed at Novo Mercado, the premium listing 
segment that requires stricter corporate governance standards.
56 At its peak in the first half of 2013, the firm’s oil production 
reached 8,500 barrels a day, less than one fifth of the level 
predicted in the IPO prospectus.
57 At that point, the company owed US$ 3.6 billion in bonds 
and US$ 500 million to suppliers, making it Latin American 
largest corporate failure. Sources: Financial Times. Eike Batista’s 
empire crumbles as talks with OGX creditors fail. October 29th 
2013. Available at http://on.ft.com/1coE0Yt; Reuters. Batista's 
OGX files for bankruptcy protection in Brazil. October 30th 
2013. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/30/
us-brazil-batista-idUSBRE99T19620131030; The Economist. 
Butista: Eike Batista’s oil firm files for bankruptcy protection. 
November 2nd 2013. Available at http://www.economist.com/
news/business/21588903-eike-batistas-oil-firm-files-bankrupt-
cy-protection-bustista. 
58 Until November 2009, OGX stock-option plan required a lock-up 
period of 36 months. In that month, the company simply 
extinguished this clause, allowing its executives to immediately 
exercise their stock options and pocket millions of dollars. 
Incredibly, this major change was not announced to the market 
at the time. Source: Exame magazine (in Portuguese). Todos 
os homens de Eike. March 19th 2014. Available at http://exame.
abril.com.br/revista-exame/edicoes/1061/noticias/todos-os-
homensde-eike
59 Source: Exame magazine (in Portuguese). Todos os homens 
de Eike. March 19th 2014. According to the publication, the 
executives pocketed between R$ 70 and R$ 200 million. The 
conversion to US$ was made at an exchange rate of R$ 2.00/1 
US$, the average rate from 2008 to 2012.
60 Source: Exame magazine. According to the publication, 
executives sold “everything they could” in the two months 
before the key announcement of far shorter reserves. It is 
estimated that they have sold around 17 million of shares 
during this brief period, pocketing around US$ 95 million.
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that collapsed in 2008. While economic value generated 
by these banks to its longer-term shareholders was 
obviously null, their executives cashed several hundred 
million dollars while stocks were overvalued.
The argument that equity-based pay induces executives to 
excessive risk-taking in their quest to please stock markets 
and pocket astronomical compensation is supported by 
empirical evidence 61. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), for 
instance, find that banks with CEOs whose incentives were 
better aligned with the interests of shareholders in terms 
of the dollar value of their stake performed worse during 
the crisis 62. DeYoung et al. (2013) also note that large U.S. 
commercial banks increased the equity-based incentives 
of its CEOs around the year 2000, and that executives 
responded by increasing banks’ business policies as well as 
risk-taking 63. 
Creating executive compensation schemes that are heavily 
dependent on something that is inherently speculative 
and dependent on the formation of beliefs, such as stock 
prices, is, therefore, very dangerous. It generates pressure 
towards “game the game”64 through strategies ranging 
from the use of legal forms of earnings management65  
to fraud 66.  
Moreover, a recent behavioral literature summarized by 
Stout (2014), shows how pay-for performance-strategies 
may lead to counterproductive and potentially disastrous 
outcomes for the governance of complex human 
organizations such as public companies.
Stout (2014) points out that ex-ante incentive schemes 
such as equity-based pay may lead to at least three adverse 
behavioral consequences. First, they tend to frame the 
social context in a way that encourages people to conclude 
that purely selfish behavior is both appropriate and 
expected. Second, the possibility of large personal rewards 
may tempt people to cut ethical and legal corners. Third, 
firms that emphasize incentive pay tend to attract individuals 
who are more prone toward selfish and opportunistic 
behavior than the average, while inducing current emplo-
yees to start acting in a more purely self-interested way 67. 
She argues that: [Pay] for performance creates very big 
temptations… Incentive contracts based on metrics subject 
to executives’ influence, especially metrics that executives 
can manipulate or falsify, create tempting opportunities 
for executives to try to extract this wealth for themselves 
through behavior that imposes costs on the corporation or 
on third parties. Thus a workplace that relies on large ma-
terial incentives to motivate employees is also a workplace 
61 In this sense, Bratton and Whatcher (2010) point out that “The 
financial sector undertook high-risk/high-return strategies to 
enhance return on equity and raise stock prices. The executi-
ves who danced to the rhythm were compensated with stock 
options and restricted stock in addition to cash bonuses, and 
so had incentives roughly in alignment with those of their 
shareholders” (p. 723).
62 According to Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), “A plausible
explanation for these findings is that CEOs focused on the interests
of their shareholders in the build-up to the crisis and took
actions that they believed the market would welcome. Ex-post,
these actions were costly to their banks and to themselves when
the results turned out to be poor… CEOs might have concluded
that they had no choice but to focus on short-run profit maximiza-
tion because they feared losing their job had they not grown their
banks’ business aggressively” (p. 12).
63 The final report of the U.S. Government Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission also recognized the reckless behavior induced by 
equity-based pay by concluding that “Too many of these institutions 
acted recklessly, taking on too much risk, with too little capital, and 
with too much dependence on short-term funding. Compensation 
systems too often rewarded the quick deal, the short-term gain – 
without proper consideration of long-term consequences. Often, 
those systems encouraged the big bet – where the payoff on the 
upside could be huge and the downside limited. This was the 
case up and down the line – from the corporate boardroom to the 
mortgage broker on the street”.
64 This expression is used originally by Martin (2011).
65 Positive results, for instance may be delayed as a sort of 
provision for other periods, while important spending may 
be cut and losses distorted in order to do not affect quarterly 
results.
66 Martin (2011) points out that the “expectations management” 
puts managers in a dilemma. If the company is doing well and 
operating at peak performance, stock markets will immediately 
incorporate in the stock price the expected future maximum 
performance. In this case, how executives would be able to raise 
stock prices even further? Since the shareholder value doctrine 
requires executives to increase stock prices continuously, they 
would need to raise market expectations about the company 
infinitely. This requires, therefore, an impossible mission from 
executives: to raise other’s people expectations continuously 
and forever (Martin, 2011, p. 193).
67 According to Stout (2014): “the end result may be not
more efficient behavior, but more uncooperative, unethical,
and illegal employee behavior”. As a solution, she recommends
trust-based compensation arrangements emphasizing rewards
that are modest, nonmonetary, and awarded ex-post on a
discretionary basis. She points out, that the use of fixed salaries
with occasional modest bonus, both adjusted ex post on the
basis of subjective criteria, was the typical form of payment for
executives of U.S. public companies until the early 1970s: “You
did a great job this past year, we’re giving you a bonus and a
raise”. Dorff (2014) points out to a somewhat similar solution
by arguing that directors should tie senior officers’ payments
to factors that are “(a) largely within officers’ control, (b) hard
to manipulate, (c) easy to measure, and (d) important to the
corporation’s long-term goals” (p. 1).
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that suppresses the force of conscience (p. 33).
Extrinsic motivations such as stock options plans, therefore, 
may “crowd out” managers’ innate internal desire to perform 
their roles properly (Gneezy et al., 2011) 68. Undermining 
intrinsic motivation is problematic because people tend 
to lose interest in their work once extrinsic factors are no 
longer offered. As a result, extrinsic rewards should be 
permanently offered to managers as motivation to sustain 
their activity.
Finally, there is also evidence that excessive and contingent 
monetary rewards may even result in a decline of perfor-
mance, especially in cognitively complex activities. This is 
the main conclusion of Ariely et al. (2009), after conducting 
extensive experiments in the U.S. and India, in which 
subjects received performance payments in varying 
amounts across multiple tasks. The authors observe that 
performance is superior for moderate economic incentives, 
but it then starts to fall beyond a certain threshold level. The 
 idea that higher monetary rewards may lead to worse 
performance is also the subject of recent neuroscience 
literature, such as in Chib et al. (2014) and Atchziger et al. (2015).
6. INCREASED INCOME INEQUALITY WITHIN FIRMS 
AND AT THE MACRO LEVEL 
In addition to its numerous side effects presented in 
the previous section, equity-based pay has skyrocketed 
top-executive compensation in Anglo-Saxon countries in 
the past thirty years, without a correspondent enhancement 
of firms’ performance (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; 
Lazonick, 2009a; Dorff, 2014) 69. This has led to increasing 
levels of income inequality at both the firm and the 
society-level, an outcome related to an array of negative 
social implications, such as higher levels of stress, violence, 
health problems, and economic capture of democratic 
institutions 70. According to Piketty and Saez (2006), the 
income share of the top decile in the U.S. from 1980 until 
2002 returned to the record levels observed before World 
War I in 1917 71. They also note that, until the 1970s, highest 
incomes in the U.S. were composed primarily of capital 
income (mostly dividends). Afterwards, salary income has 
been driving up top incomes, becoming nowadays the main 
source of income (and of economic inequality) at the very 
top 72.  
In a cross-country comparison, Piketty and Saez (2006) 
identify a major divergence: while top income shares have 
remained fairly stable in continental Europe and Japan 
since the 1970s, they have increased enormously in the 
U.S. and other English-speaking countries. In their view,
[This] rise of top income shares is due not to the revival of 
top capital incomes, but rather to the very large increases 
in top wages (especially top executive compensation). Top 
executives replaced top capital owners at the top of the 
income hierarchy during the twentieth century (p. 204)73.  
More recently, Saez (2013) shows that the trend towards 
income concentration in the U.S. continues after the 2008 
global financial crisis. According to the author, the top 1% 
incomes grew by 31.4% from 2009 to 2012, while the bot-
tom 99% incomes grew only by 0.4% 74. In his view,
the Great Recession has only depressed top income shares 
temporarily and will not undo any of the dramatic increase 
in top income shares that has taken place since the 1970s. 
Indeed, the top decile income share in 2012 is equal to 
50.4%, the highest ever since 1917 when the series start 
(p. 1)75.
68 The reduction in intrinsic motivation due to an excess of external 
rewards is a phenomenon also known as the overjustification effect. 
69 It is important to note that managerial pay increased even 
without a clear improvement in the performance of corporations 
on an aggregate basis.
70 There is a huge literature pointing out to the negative economic 
and social impacts deriving from higher economic inequality. 
Among other problems, countries with greater economic inequa-
lity exhibit lower levels of economic growth, lower life expectancy, 
higher level of violence, stress, mental disorders, etc.
71 After decomposing the top decile into three groups, Picketty and 
Saez (2006) observe that most fluctuations are due to fluctuations 
within the top 1% percentile
72 The concentration of income at corporations can be observed 
by the evolution of CEO pay relative to worker pay in the U.S. 
According to the Economic Policy Institute, it climbed from 
around 25 in 1970 to around 300 in 2010.
73 The authors point out that understanding why top wages 
have surged in English-speaking countries in recent decades 
but not in continental Europe or Japan is a very controversial 
topic. One strand argues that technological progress has made 
managerial skills more general and less firm-specific, increasing 
competition for the best executives from segregated within-firm 
markets to a single worldwide market. (If this is true, then 
impediments to free markets due to labor market regulations 
or social norms regarding pay inequality should have kept 
executive pay below market in markets outside the Anglo-Saxon 
world). The other strand, in turn, points out that the surge in 
top compensation in the U.S. is due to the increased ability of 
executives to set their own pay and extract rents at the expense 
of shareholders.
74 The top 1%, therefore, has captured 95% of the income gains in 
the first three years of the recovery.
75 Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) show that, for full-time 
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Research in the field of sociology of organizations explain 
how the rise of shareholder value orientation has increased 
economic inequality through the restructuring of social 
relations and income dynamics in the organizational setting. 
Shin (2012) , for example, shows how portraying yourself as 
a supporter of shareholder value pays off for executives. He 
reaches this conclusion after analyzing the relationship 
between orientation to this doctrine and financial rewards 
for 290 CEOs for the 1996-2006 period. He observes that 
compensation is greater in firms with a stronger display of 
shareholder value orientation than in non-shareholder-
value firms. Moreover, he notes that when firms strengthen 
their appearance of shareholder value orientation by 
enhancing monitoring and incentive pay system, CEO pay 
increases the subsequent year 76. His interpretation is that 
firms adopt monitoring and incentive-alignment mechanisms 
symbolically, only to signal investors their conformity with 
its principles. This, in turn, increases managers’ legitimacy, 
leading to an increased in their compensation regardless of 
their performance. In his words: [Even] though the
shareholder value ideology was initially proposed to curb 
managerial power, it may have paradoxically provided 
powerful managers with a symbolic and rhetorical tool for 
accumulating personal wealth. This may explain a signifi-
cant part of the rise in CEO compensation (p. 554).
 Hanley (2011), in turn, investigates the sources for the 
growth of high-wages and rising inequality in the wor-
kplace. She finds that earnings associated with high-wage 
occupations vary across industry groups depending on the 
prevalence of performance pay practices 77. She notes that 
“pay initiatives tying individual earnings to measures of
company performance such as shareholder value increase 
managers’ earnings, independent of their particular skills” 
(p. 903). As a result, she concludes that pay initiatives 
rewarding a small class of workers probably serves as the 
main mechanism for high-wage earnings growth and rising 
inequality.
The connection between financialization (one of the 
consequences of the cult of shareholder value) and rising 
income inequality in non-financial companies is the subject 
of two recent papers. Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) 
analyses this issue for several U.S. industries from 1970-2008. 
They find that, in the long run, increasing dependence on 
financial income is associated with reducing labor’s relative 
income; increasing top executives’ relative compensation; 
and increasing earnings dispersion among workers 78. 
Financialization accounts for more than half of the decline 
in labor’s share of income; 9.6% of the growth in executives’ 
fraction of compensation; and 10.2% of the growth in 
earnings dispersion between 1970 and 2008. In their view, 
the institutional shift since the 1980s from managerialism 
to the shareholder value conception of the firm is at its 
core a system of redistribution that has privileged a limited 
set of actors 79. Alvarez (2015), in turn, finds a similar result 
after analyzing 6,980 non-financial firms from 2004 to 2013 in 
France. He concludes that increased dependence on financial 
profits is likely to decrease wage share in non-financial French 
companies. In his view, the growing involvement of non-financial 
companies in financial markets has increased financial 
profits, which in turn has resulted in less bargaining power 
for employees relative to shareholders and managers.
7. OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR OF SHAREHOLDERS 
SEEKING SHORT-TERM GAINS IN M&AS
This critique derives from the Blair and Stout (1999) team 
production theory. Their theory explores the economic 
importance of firm-specific investments made by stakeholders 
for organizations to succeed. In this sense, all stakeholders--
especially employees, suppliers and local communities--
make specific investments that goes far beyond what 
their contracts require 80. If some shareholders could profit 
from opportunistic strategies that threatens the value of 
workers, the Gini index of earnings inequality increased 26% 
between 1980 and 2007 in the U.S. They also point out income 
inequality in the U.S. is now equivalent to that of developing 
countries such as Iran, China, and Mexico.
76 According to Shin (2012), “Shareholder value mechanisms 
did not curb the surge of pay; rather, it preceded the CEO pay
raise” (p. 538).
77 Interestingly, she also observes that low-wage occupations 
do not vary across industry groups.
78 Their results are obtained net of other factors conventionally 
pointed as causes of higher income inequality, such as de-
unionization, globalization, technological change, and capital 
investment.
79 According to Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), we believe that 
firms’ increasing reliance on financial, rather than production, 
income decoupled the generation of surplus from production and 
sales, strengthening owners’ and elite workers’ negotiating power 
against other workers. The result was an incremental exclusion of 
the general workforce from revenue-generating and compensation-
setting processes (p. 1285).
80 This specific-firm investments are of course not fully protected 
by formal contracts.
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other stakeholders’ specific investments, then stakeholders 
would be discouraged to make firm-specific investments 
in the first place. In order to avoid this bad outcome for 
all constituencies (including long-term shareholders) 
companies should create mechanisms to avoid actions 
from opportunistic stockholders. 
Mayer (2013) develops a similar criticism focusing on the 
dangers of an open market for corporate control. He argues 
that companies are a mechanism to sustain long-term 
commitments among different stakeholders and that 
these implicit or explicit commitments will only work if it 
is costly to other parties to act opportunistically. His point 
is that such commitment cannot be sustained with an 
active market for corporate control because shareholders, 
especially those short-term oriented, will be tempted to act 
opportunistically by selling the company anytime when 
an opportunity of quick returns arises. When it is sure that 
shareholders will act opportunistically, the corporation 
becomes “a rent extraction vehicle for the shortest-term 
shareholders” (Mayer, 2013, p. 240). and aligning manage-
rial rewards to shareholder returns will only reinforce this 
opportunism 81. 
 
The hostile takeover of Cadbury, a British corporate icon 
with over 200 years, by U.S. Kraft in 2010 is considered a 
classic case highlighting this problem. On September 7th 
2010, the buyer offered £7.45 per share, a 30% premium 
above the stock price at the time 82. After hiring outside 
advisors and reviewing the proposal, Cadbury’s board 
concluded that it was derisory 83. Without managers’ 
support, Kraft initiated the hostile takeover attempt by 
sending a letter of intent directly to Cadbury shareholders. 
Speculation about the ongoing operation increased 
Cadbury’s stock to around £8.00. The stock’s appreciation 
prompted a change in the profile of shareholders that 
would determine the outcome of the takeover. Before the 
offer, short-term traders held about 5% of its shares. Several 
hedge funds then started to buy shares in the expectation 
of making quick gains from the operation. On the other 
side, long-term shareholders sold a part of their holdings 
to enhance their portfolios’ return (a process called “top 
slicing”). Throughout 19 weeks, 26% of the shares passed 
into the hands of short-term oriented hedge funds, which 
ended up with 31% of the Cadbury’s stock. 
In a lecture about the takeover, Roger Carr, former Chairman 
of Cadbury’s board, summed up the unfolding of case 84:
[The] fate of the company was sealed long before the final 
act. It was determined more by the significant changes 
which have taken place in the share register during the 
bid period. That had more effect than any other event... 
Hedge funds were buying only for the short-term profits. 
Their activity increased along with the likelihood of the 
transaction occurring. In other words, if they could buy 
enough shares, the deal would become a self-fulfilling pro-
phecy… It was the interests of this ownership profile at the 
end of the process that the board was representing when 
it agreed with the final offer of £8.50. Since most hedge 
funds had acquired shares below £8.00, we knew the battle 
for independence was lost [when Kraft revised its offer to 
£8.30] because the majority of our shareholders would 
have sold out for this price, or even less. [In this case,] 
most of the short-term shareholders would earn a profit of 
about £0.30 per share for holding the stock for just about 
six weeks, an annualized gain of 33% 85. So, in pursuit of 
shareholder value the task became clear, however personal 
unpalatable: it was to negotiate for the best price posible 
for our shareholders. Fiduciary duty had to overcome emo-
tional instinct. In the final analysis, it was the shift in the 
share register that lost the battle for Cadbury. The owners 
were progressively not long-term stewards of business, 
but financially motivated investors judged solely on the 
quarterly financial performance. At the end of the day, 
there were simply not enough shareholders prepared to 
81 There is an extensive literature on takeovers that goes far 
beyond the scope of this paper. On average, it shows that 
shareholders from target companies usually benefit form an active 
market of corporate control, while the outcomes for shareholders 
of acquiring firms are mixed (being more likely to earn negative 
rather than positive stock returns). In addition, stakeholders from 
target companies (especially employees) usually suffers negative 
impacts from these operations.
82 The offer totaled £10.2 billion paid 60% in stocks and 40% in cash.
83 The board decided that any offer below £8.50 (a 50% premium 
on the stock price before Kraft’s offer) would not be recommen-
dable. In the end, this was precisely what Kraft offered for the 
operation to succeed. 
84 “Cadbury: Hostile bids and takeovers”. University of Oxford – 
Distinguished Speaker Seminar Series from the Said Business 
School. Available at https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/roger-carr-cad-
bury-hostile-bids-and-takeovers 
85 Actually, since the final offer was £8.50, most hedge funds 
earned an annualized return of around 50% for holding Cadbury’s 
shares for a few weeks. As usual in other takeovers, the outcome 
was far from bright for other stakeholders of the target company. 
When Kraft announced its initial offer, CEO Irene Rosenfeld 
stated “our current plans contemplate that the UK would be a net 
beneficiary in terms of jobs. For example, we believe we would be 
in a position to continue to operate the Somerdale facility, which 
is currently planned to be closed, and to invest in Bournville, 
thereby preserving UK manufacturing jobs” (Source: Clarke, 2010). 
One week after concluding the deal, though, Kraft announced 
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take a long-term view of Cadbury and prepared to forego 
short-term gain for longer term prosperity.86 This is the 
clear message: individuals controlling shares which they 
held only for a few days or weeks determined the destiny of 
a company that have been built over almost 200 years.87
The Cadbury takeover demonstrates the danger of
 opportunistic behavior from short-term oriented 
shareholders when they become decisive for key 
corporate decisions, especially in companies with 
dispersed ownership structures 88. It also shows how the 
(questionable) belief, ingrained among directors, that 
they should maximize shareholder value may lead to 
potentially harmful decisions for other stakeholders 
and of the company in the long run. 
Interestingly, the episode also reveals the difficulty of 
properly interpreting the view that directors should owe 
fiduciary duties solely to shareholders when their profile 
and preferences change substantially in a few weeks. In 
Cadbury’s case, the shareholder base composed primarily 
of institutions interested in the long-term success of the 
company at the beginning of the takeover process was 
sharply transformed into one with a strong presence of 
short-term investors seeking quick gains. The shareholder 
value precept, therefore, overlook the fact that shareholders 
constitute a heterogeneous block with different interests 
and time horizons 89.  
8. INCREASED JOB INSECURITY, STRESS, AND 
LACK OF PURPOSE IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT
As noted in the previous section, the long-term success 
of a company depends on the collective effort of all its 
stakeholders. This, in turn, usually requires them to make 
firm-specific and-non recoverable investments in the 
organization (Blair and Stout, 1999; Mayer, 2013). 
To critics, the obsession with shareholder value maximization 
reduces companies’ commitment towards its stakeholders 
by converting them into disposable and interchangeable 
resources 90. The relationship with stakeholders becomes 
increasingly dehumanized, fostering an organizational 
atmosphere with higher levels of stress, anxiety, and 
aggressiveness, as well as less sense of purpose and 
engagement. 
The interesting case of the multinational brewery 
Ambev, considered the poster boy of shareholder value 
the closure of its centennial Somerdale factory of Cadbury and the 
transfer of its activities to Poland.
86 Carr also notes that “The short-term players that obtained the 
pivotal position in determining the outcome by accumulating 
shares from long term funds also hedged their bets at the same 
time in case the bid failed and the share price fell back”.
87 It is very interesting to note that, although Carr raises concerns 
about current takeover rules in the British market from a wider 
perspective, he himself admits being an advocate of shareholder 
value whose career has been built in a platform of M&A activity: 
“By instinct, because of my career, I am a complete free marketer. 
I do not believe in protectionism or safe harbors. I do believe 
very strongly in open markets, shareholder value, management 
challenge, the role of hedge funds, constant pressure from 
competition and the threat of corporate activity… A hostile 
takeover requires a passionate believe in the cause that you are 
fighting. And the cause is the value it creates for shareholders… 
In execution [of the takeover defense], there are four golden 
rules to remember. One, you are fighting for shareholder 
value, and only value...” (emphasis added). For more about 
Cadbury’s case, see Clarke (2010) and Tsagas (2014).
88 For Mayer (2013), trust is an essential element for people to 
engage into long-term contracts and it is paramount avoiding 
companies to behave opportunistically. In an article commen-
ting on Mayer’s book, Financial Times Columnist points out 
“But, a company whose goal is whatever seems profitable today 
can be trusted only to renegade implicit contract”. Source: 
Opportunistic shareholders must embrace commitment. 
Financial Times. August 26th, 2014. Available at http://on.ft.
com/1nywFGb 
89 Stout argues that the standard shareholder-centered model has 
favored short-term speculators over long-term investors. 
According to the autor “Activist hedge-funds have the clear 
advantage, because they concentrate their investment 
portfolios into just a few securities. This means it is worth their 
while to spend the time and effort necessary to become involved 
in a particular firm’s affairs. Diversified retail investors, by contrast, 
rarely have a big enough stake in any single company to make it 
sensible to closely monitor what’s going on; they suffer from their 
own rational apathy. Mutual funds are not much better. Most 
fund managers rationally conclude it is not in their client’s best 
interests for them to exercise an active governance in the 
hundreds of firms whose stocks the fund manager keeps in his 
portfolio” (p. 70). For more studies on the effects of shareholder 
activism, see Kahan and Rock (2007), Anabtawi and Stout 
(2008), Betch et al. (2009), Brav et al. (2009), Bratton and 
Wachter (2010), Yermack (2010), and Cheffins and Armour (2011). 
90 It is important to note that the pressure for stock price 
maximization can be divided in two stages that end up harming 
stakeholders. First, market agents pressure managers to adopt 
business practices aiming to promote shareholder value. 
Second, managers tend to divert this pressure onto stakeholders,
particularly on employees.
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91 Jorge Paulo Lemann, Marcel Telles e Beto Sicupira.
92 Fortune Magazine. “Here’s what happens when 3G Capital 
buys your company”. March 25th 2015. Article by Daniel 
Roberts. Available at http://fortune.com/2015/03/25/3g-capital
-heinz-kraft-buffett/. The 3G Fund usually implements an 
accounting technique known as zero-based budgeting as part 
of their corporate strategy. This scheme compels divisions to 
justify all costs for each year, rather than simply adjusting the 
baseline spending from the previous year. One of the favorite 
phrases of Mr. Sicupira, one of the partners, is that “costs are 
like fingernails: You have to cut them constantly.” Source: Time 
Magazine. Bud Brewer Braced for Change. July 15th 2008. 
Available at http://content.time.com/time/business/
article/0,8599,1822811,00.html 
93 Financial Times. “Ruthless operating focus behind 3G rise”. 
March 25th 2015. Available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
a7fcbc1a-d30c-11e4-a792-00144feab7de.html#axzz3YoCYtIlC. 
For understanding Ambev’s management style, see also: 
Financial Times. “Jorge Paulo Lemann, a lean, hungry mogul”. 
March 27th 2015. Available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
ad85be00-d2ff-11e4-b7a8-00144feab7de.html#axzz3YoCYtIlC. 
94 Ambev Annual Report 2002. English version available at 
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/nys/abv/reports/
AR_AmBev_2002.pdf 
95 In 2014, 680 Ambev managers held stock options of the 
company. The plan of equity-based compensation is administered 
by the board of directors, who is at the same time one of its 
beneficiaries. Source: Reference Form 2014.
96 Source: Reference Form 2015. Section 13. Available at http://
ri.ambev.com.br/ 
97 For comparison purposes, Ambev’s CEO and Chairman
 compensations represent 1,256 and 718 times the annual 
compensation of the average Brazilian worker, respectively.
98 As an example of this its aggressiveness culture, it is reported 
the tables of Ambev’s in-company MBA course for its high-
potential executives are filled with red fabric tomatoes. Each 
time the lecturer or a student says something considered foolish, 
the students throw tomatoes towards on him or her. Source. 
Revista Exame. “Bônus, tomates e patos. December 12th 2000. 
Available at http://exame.abril.com.br/revista-exame/
edicoes/729/noticias/bonus-tomates-e-patos-m0047822  
99 Folha de São Paulo. “AmBev faz campanha para mostrar lado 
"menos agressivo”. July 23rd 2010. Article by Mariana Barbo-
sa. Available at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mercado/
me2307201009.htm
100 Source: Time Magazine. Bud Brewer Braced for Change. July 
15th 2008. Available at http://content.time.com/time/business/
article/0,8599,1822811,00.html. In 2009, Ambev also received 
a record fine of BRL 350 million from Brazilian authorities for 
harmful and unfair competition in the beer market. Source: 
Valor Econômico. Cade aplica multa recorde de R$ 352,7 milhões 
a Ambev por concorrência desleal. July 22nd 2009. 
101 A more detailed description of these cases is available at ERA 
(Ética e Realidade Atual): http://era.org.br/2011/10/am bev- asse-
dio-moral-e-baluarte-de-estilo-vitorioso/ 
102 Case AIRR 1370/2005-006-20-40.0 from 6ª Turma do Tribunal 
in the Brazilian market, provides anecdotal evidence 
supporting this criticism. The company is controlled 
by a group of three entrepreneurs 91 who owns a private 
equity firm (3G Capital) which is laser-focused on 
maximizing earnings. According to Fortune Magazine, 
“the cutthroat Brazilian private-equity firm is known 
for swift layoffs, cost-cutting — and profit” 92, whereas 
Financial Times emphasizes its “ruthless operating focus” 93. 
Ambev adopts economic value added, one of the 
tenets of the shareholder value movement, as its 
performance measure since the late 1990s. In its 2002 
Annual Report, for example, the company reported: 
“our target is to grow the Economic Value Added 
(EVA) at a minimum of 15% a year in real terms with a 
20% return on equity (ROE)” 94. Its incentive system is 
strongly based on massive stock option plans for both 
its executives as well as for board members 95. Variable 
compensation (not counting stocks and stock option 
plans) represented around 70% of the total executive 
compensation in 2014 96.  From 2011 to 2013, its CEO 
pocketed around R$ 18 million (US$ 6 million) per 
year without accounting for equity-based payments, 
while its Chairman earned around R$ 9 million per 
year 97. The company is widely recognized in Brazil for 
its aggressive corporate culture98, to the point that it 
has launched a public relations campaign to show its 
“less aggressive” side to society in 201099.
One of the (predictable) results of Ambev’s shareholder
-driven culture are the complaints from several of its 
stakeholders about its ruthless behavior and lack of 
long-term commitment. After taking over the Belgian 
company Interbrew, for instance, the local union argued 
that it broke promises by carrying out plant closures, la-
yoffs, and changes in work rules. According to one union 
leader “I wouldn’t trust their promises…InBev is all about 
money… Before it was run by brewers, but now it’s [by] 
bankers” 100.
The company has also been subject to several lawsuits 
in the Brazilian courts for bullying and psychological 
harassment filed by its former employees 101. Among the 
bizarre situations reported in these lawsuits are cases of 
employees subjected to several punishments in case of 
not meeting their goals, such as: i) doing push-ups until 
exhaustion with the boss stepping on his back 102; ii) lying 
in coffins while being portrayed as chickens hanged in the 
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Superior do Trabalho de Sergipe. Available at http://www.conjur.
com.br/2006-dez-18/ex-empregado_ambev_indenizacao_danos 
103 Case RR-32100-53.2006.5.04.0101, 2ª Turma do TST do Rio 
Grande do Sul. Available at http://economia.estadao.com.br/
noticias/geral,ambev-tera-de-indenizar-ex-funcionario-por-dano
-moral,53717e 
104 Case RR 985/2006-025-03-00.7 3ª turma Tribunal Superior do 
Trabalho de Minas Gerais. Available at http://www.direitonet.
com.br/noticias/exibir/11479/Ambev-e-condenada-por-usar-
assedio-moral-para-aumentar-produtividade 
105 A “polish corridor” is a form of punishment in which the 
person has to go through a group of people aligned in two lines 
facing each so that they form a “corridor”. During the passage, 
the person receives slaps and other forms of physical abuse 
from the people who formed the corridor. 
106 Case nº 00887/2003-015-04-00, 8ª Turma do Tribunal Re-
gional do Trabalho da 4ª Região do Rio de Janeiro. Available at 
http://www.conjur.com.br/2004-ago-17/ambev_condenada_sub-
meter_empregado_humilhacoes 
107 Case TRT 6ª Reg., Proc. Nº 00340-2004-005-06-00-1 available 
at http://www.conjur.com.br/2006-ago-23/ambev_pagar_mil-
hao_assedio_moral_coletivo  
108 In another case, Ambev was condemned to pay BRL 1 million 
in a collective psychological harassment case involving dozens 
of workers punished for not meeting their sales goals. Case TRT 
6ª Reg., Proc. Nº 00340-2004-005-06-00-1 available at http://
www.conjur.com.br/2006-ago-23/ambev_pagar_milhao_assedio_
moral_coletivo
109 According to court documents, the “employee of the 
month” received the right to choose one of the prostitutes 
for his personal pleasure as an award (all paid with company 
resources). The employee who sued the company claimed to 
suffer psychological problems due to conflicts with his religion. 
Case RR-3253900-09.2007.5.09.0011. 5ª turma do TST do Paraná. 
Available at http://www.istoedinheiro.com.br/noticias/nego-
cios/20120914/sexo-cerveja-bonus-ambev/102465.shtml 
110 Case AIRR 1370/2005-006-20-40.0 from 6ª Turma do Tribunal 
Superior do Trabalho de Sergipe. Available at http://www.conjur.
com.br/2006-dez-18/ex-empregado_ambev_indenizacao_danos
111 Gallup interviewed 2,654 managers from diverse industries. 
Source: Gallup. 2014. State of the American manager: analytics 
and advice for leaders. Available at http://www.gallup.com/
services/182138/state-american-manager.aspx 
112 Source: http://www.gallup.com/opinion/chairman/169208/
millions-bad-managers-killing-america-growth.aspx 
113 It is also worthy to note that this strikingly low engagement 
level in the U.S. has been stagnant since 2000, when Gallup 
began tracking this indicator. 
114 The author has been of one of the first to argue that a “new 
capitalism” has emerged in the U.S. since 1980. He also notes that, 
before the 1980s, managers engaged in downsizing only reluctantly 
because expanding the size of the firm was the hallmark mana-
gement. Afterwards, downsizing has become as a strategy to 
manage shareholder value by signaling investors the managerial 
commitment to increase stock value.
meeting room 103; iii) being forced to wear skirts, lipstick 
and helmets with horns 104; iv) going through a “polish 
corridor”105 while hearing insults from their managers 106; 
v) being forbidden to sit during meetings 107; and, vi) being 
obliged to dance in front of others while wearing t-shirts 
with offensive sayings 108.
Ambev’s legal problems have not been confined to its 
unorthodox punishments. Its incentive system has also 
been subject to lawsuits. In one case, for instance, a former 
employee sued the company for being obliged to attend 
morning events in which prostitutes performed stripteases 
as part of “motivational” sessions to increase sales 109. In 
other case, one of the supervisors used to gunshot 
competitor’s logo in order to “incentivize” employees 110. 
There is also broader evidence supporting the criticism 
that the lack of long-term commitment resulting 
from shareholder value maximization lead to poorer 
organizational environments. A 2014 Gallup poll, for instance, 
concluded that only 35% of U.S. managers are engaged in 
their jobs, while 51% are not engaged and 14% are actively 
disengaged 111. The figure for lower level employees is even 
most impressive, demonstrating that “of the country's 
roughly 100 million full-time employees, an alarming 70 
million (70%) are either not engaged at work or are actively 
disengaged” 112. 
Gallup estimates that this lack of engagement costs 
between U$450 billion to $550 billion in lost productivi-
ty per year for the economy. Interestingly, among the 
twelve items used to measure the level of engagement, 
the institution concludes that one of the two most 
important questions that lead to higher engagement is 
“The mission or purpose of my company makes me feel my 
job is important”. As a result, it is possible to conjecture that 
companies with the uninspiring mission of maximizing 
profits, as prescribed by the shareholder value approach, 
naturally tend to fare worst in this item 113. 
Research in the field of sociology of organizations and 
political economy also presents a dramatic picture linking 
the rise of the shareholder value movement in the 1980s 
to the disintegration of the postwar business-labor social 
contract in developed countries, leading to increasing job 
insecurity and declining working conditions.
In one of the earlier studies on this field, Budros (1997) 
examines the causes of the adoption of downsizing 
programs among Fortune 100 firms from 1979 to 1994 114.
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115 Other factors include, foreign consolidations, market share, 
deregulation, and business peaks. 
116 Interestingly, the authors observe that shareholder value 
strategies operating across industries end up putting pressure 
on all firms to conform to those tactics.
117 The authors analyze U.S. Fortune 500 corporations from 1989 
to 2009.  
He finds that the orientation toward shareholder value is 
one of the main predictors of downsizing decisions 115. 
He also observes that, while firms are supposed to make 
personnel cuts for economic reasons, the outcomes of 
these cuts generally are negative. As a result, he concludes 
that “[Even] though the economic rationality of downsizers 
seems limited, the analysis also discloses that downsi-
zers are motivated by noneconomic factors — especially 
social acceptance of downsizing — and that they receive 
noneconomic rewards – especially favorable reputations 
— for their actions” (p. 247). In other words, organizations 
are motivated by economic as well as social considerations, 
and both forms of rationality are needed to fully explain 
downsizings.
Fligstein and Shin (2007) use data from 62 U.S. industries for 
the 1984-2000 period to analyze the impact of shareholder 
value strategies, such as mergers and lay-offs, on unionization 
and profitability. In line with shareholder value arguments, 
they observe that industries where mergers were active 
subsequently saw an increase in layoffs. However, contrary 
to shareholder value arguments, there did not find evidence 
that mergers or layoffs returned industries to profitability. 
They conclude by arguing that “shareholder value tactics 
to reorganize firms and industries failed in their central 
goal – to increase profits” 116.
Jung (2015) also studies how the shareholder-value 
paradigm has contributed to the prevalence of widepread 
lay-offs since the 1980s by investigating downsizing 
announcements from 714 US firms between 1981 and 2006. 
He finds that both the pressure from institutional investors 
and the new decision context for managers’ behavior 
provided by the rise of shareholder value encourage 
firms to downsize more frequently. The new managerial 
“decision context” can be observed, according to the 
author, by indicators such as the granting of stock-option 
plans; the level of board independence; and the presence 
of the CFO on the board of directors.
Jung (2015) also provides three examples of how even 
firms with good economic performance opt to downsize 
as part of a shareholder-value strategy (p. 1338). In 1997, 
Kimberly-Clark eliminated 5,000 jobs in a bid to push the 
company closer to achieving management’s goal of dou-
bling earnings per share between 1995 and 2000.  In 2000, 
Dell Computer, after failing to meet Wall Street analysts’ 
quarterly earnings forecasts for just seven cents, 
announced its intention to cut 1,700 jobs in order to 
improve profit margins. In 2006, Alcoa planned to cut 6,700 
jobs in spited of making record earnings in the first three 
quarters of that year. In this case, its CEO stated that the 
company needed to take the “difficult but necessary” steps 
to move forward.
In addition to increase job insecurity, the shareholder 
value paradigm has also been linked to declining wor-
king conditions. In this sense, for instance, Briscoe and 
Murphy (2012) find that financial analysts’ downgrades 
can lead companies to cut retiree health benefits 117. 
According to the authors: [Since] the early 1990s, large 
corporations have been increasingly cutting back on 
their earlier commitments to retirees’ health benefits… 
As securities analysts increasingly came to view other 
post-employment benefits (OPEB) liabilities as a drag on 
future corporate earnings, they began raising the issue in 
earnings conference calls with managers. When analysts 
downgrade their recommendations for a company’s stock, 
one way managers can respond – signaling their commit-
ment to shareholder value creation – is to announce OPEB 
curtailments (pp. 555 and 570).
Actually, companies’ reduced long-term commitment and 
increased job insecurity have reached senior executives as 
well. Montier (2014), for instance, shows that the average 
tenure for CEOs in the U.S. has been halved from almost 12 
years in the 1970s to around six years in 2013. According to 
the author, “[It] is little wonder that CEOs may be incen-
tivized to extract maximum rent in the mínimum time 
possible given the shrinkage of their time horizons” (p. 7). 
Higher levels of managerial turnover embeds a dangerous 
tacit message: everybody who makes into the top should 
get rich as quickly as possible by pleasing (and never 
contradicting) the market.
9. PROMOTION OF AMORAL BEHAVIOR AND
ETHICAL BLINDNESS
Indoctrinating executives with the idea that their job is 
only to maximize stockholder’s wealth may lead to two re-
lated negative consequences in terms of ethical behavior. 
The first one is to induce executives to act in an amoral 
way as prescribed by Becker’s (1968) descriptive model of 
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118 The participants had served on average in six boards of 
directors and had an average of 20 years of management 
experience.
119 Stout (2012) shows that this premise is simply wrong for U.S. 
publicly-held companies. According to her, shareholder primacy is 
not required by law in the U.S. and managers have wide discretion 
to consider other corporate constituencies in their decisions. 
120 The results were completely different for the group informed 
that they were partners in a privately-held partnership. In this case, 
only 3 out of 17 (18%) responded that they were vote for their 
company to keep issuing the carcinogenic toxin in the environment. 
Another ethical case was applied to both groups presenting a 
lower level of social threat. The results were qualitatively the same.
121 According to Palazzo et al. (2012), “often, however, (un)ethical 
decision making is less rational and deliberate but more intuitive 
and automatic. As a consequence, the ethical dimension of a 
decision is not necessarily visible to the decision maker. People 
may behave unethically without being aware of it – they may even 
be convinced that they are doing the right thing. It is only later
that they realize the unethical dimension of their decision” (p. 323).
122 This term is also originally created by Palazzo et al. (2012).
123 In a related paper, Gonin et al. (2012) argue that “the dark side 
crime. As a result, they become convinced that a proper 
decision is the one that only considers its economic benefits 
and costs, which means that ethical concerns tends to be 
intentionally left aside.
Rose (2006) demonstrates the potential damaging effects 
of this perspective. He conducted an experiment with 34 
active directors of Fortune 200 corporations 118.  Participants 
were randomly assigned to two different groups of 17 
persons. They were then required to make a decision 
based on an ethical case involving environmental and 
social considerations. In short, the case portrayed a 
situation in which they were directors of an industry 
that releases two toxic byproducts into the environment 
with similar properties. One of the toxins has been recently 
regulated because scientific evidence indicates it is 
carcinogenic, while the other has remained unregulated. 
The case then asks directors whether they would allow 
their companies to keep issuing the second (unregulated) 
toxin in the environment, in spite of its known carcinogenic 
properties. The only difference between the two groups 
of participants was that the first was informed that they 
were board members of a corporation listed on the NYSE, 
while the second was informed that they were partners 
in a privately-held partnership. The results were striking. 
Among the group of directors of NYSE companies, 15 out 
of 17 (88%) voted for their companies to keep issuing the 
carcinogenic toxin in the environment. 
According to the Rose (2006), they recognized the ethical 
and social implications of their decisions, but believed 
that current corporate law requires them to pursue legal 
courses of action that maximize shareholder value 119. 
In his word, [This] research finds that directors follow a 
hierarchy of legal compliance when making decisions 
that affect social responsibility…When acting in a socially 
responsible manner requires violation of federal/states 
laws or violation of the duty to maximize shareholder 
wealth, directors may choose to intentionally harm socie-
ty. Directors are aware of the ethical implications of their 
decisions, but they make decisions that offer the greatest 
legal protection” (p. 328)120. 
In Rose’s experiment, directors are clearly aware of the 
ethical implications of their decisions. However, this is not 
always the case. Actually, recent studies in an emerging 
field of behavioral ethics shows that we are often subject 
to “ethical blind spots” that lead us to behave unethically 
and against our values without noticing (Bazerman and 
Tenbrusel, 2011; Palazzo et al., 2012; Ariely, 2013) 121.
The second related critique, in terms of ethical behavior, 
against indoctrinating executives with the belief that 
theirs job consists solely of maximizing stockholders’ 
wealth, therefore, is that shareholder value ideology 
significantly contributes to the process of “ethical blindness” 
that leads normal people making unethical decisions. This 
term has been coined by Palazzo et al. (2012) in a paper 
in which they model unethical decisions as the result 
of an interplay between personal traits of the decision 
maker and characteristics of the situation in a process that 
unfolds over time. They define ethical blindness as “the 
temporary inability of a decision maker to see the ethical 
dimension of a decision at stake” (p. 325). Under Palazzo 
et al. (2012) view, people become ethically blind because 
they apply a limited and rigid perspective of reality when 
making decisions. This “rigid framing”122  is reinforced by 
contextual pressures that can be divided into proximal 
and distal factors. The proximal context includes situational 
as well as organizational factors, while the distal context 
describes the overarching institutional context in which 
individuals and organizations are embedded.
In their model, shareholder value ideology acts as part of 
an institutional context that pressures managers to disregard 
the ethical implications of their acts. In their words, 
key (implicit) assumptions of rigid economic, legal and 
scientific framing are that profit maximization is inherently 
moral, that laws are the only moral limit to profits and that 
scientific expertise should prevail over the concerns 
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of organizations (the ‘barrels’) and their members (the ‘apples’) 
cannot be addressed properly without a clear understanding 
of the context in which they operate (the ‘larder’). As we argue 
below, the institutionalized view of the roles and responsibili-
ties of individual and organizational actors has an impact on 
how they behave. Business decisions are not made in a vacuum 
but are embedded in normative forces that are stronger than 
the organizations themselves” (p. 31).
124 On average, the bank employees had 11.5 years of experience 
in the banking industry. Roughly half of them worked in a 
core business unit, that is, as private bankers, asset managers, 
traders or investment managers.
125 This is a process called as “priming” in the psychology literature. 
It refers to activating particular representations or 
associations in memory just before carrying out a task. Examples 
of the questions used by Cohn et al. (2014) to prime the 
participants are “At which bank are you presently employed?” 
or “What is your function at this bank?”.
126 In order to mimic the competitive nature of the banking 
profession, subjects were informed that their earnings would 
only be paid out if they were higher or equal to those of a 
randomly drawn subject from a pilot study.
127 On average, participants from the control group reported 
successful coin flips in 51.6% of the cases, which is not significantly 
different from the expected 50% if everyone behaved honestly.
128 Given that there was no chance of being caught cheating, it 
would have been “economically rational” to argue that all tosses 
resulted in the outcome that would entail the maximum econo-
mic payoff. The authors also asked subjects about the extent to 
which they endorse the statement that social status is primarily 
determined by financial success. They find that subjects in 
the professional identity condition endorsed the statement 
significantly more strongly than those in the control condition. 
This stronger endorsement, in turn, has shown to be positively 
correlated with the reported number of successful outcomes.
129 A recent global survey from The Economist Intelligence Unit 
of affected laypersons, respectively. People who use those 
frames do not necessarily make unethical decisions. 
However, using these frames rigidly increases the proba-
bility that people don’t see the ethical dimension of their 
decision. (p. 327)123.
Stout (2011, 2014) also reveals how our capacity to behave 
ethically depends on the social context as well as how 
contextual changes can produce dramatic changes in 
observed behavior. She argues that four social cues seem 
to trigger ethical and prosocial behavior: (1) instructions 
from authority; (2) perceptions of common “in-group” 
status; (3) expectations regarding others’ prosociality; and, 
(4) magnitude of the benefits to others from one’s own 
unselfish action. According to Stout (2014) [The] result 
somewhat resembles the fictional protagonista of the tale 
The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Sometimes 
we are caring, conscientious, and considerate of others’ 
welfare (Dr. Jekyll). Sometimes we are selfish and asocial 
(Mr. Hyde). Which persona dominates in any particular 
situation seems determined largely by social context (p. 23).
A recent paper by Cohn et al. (2014) demonstrates how 
the context may induce people to behave unethically. 
They conduct and experiment with 128 employees from 
a large bank 124. For half, they asked questions about their 
professional background in order to salient their professional 
identity 125. For the other half (the control condition), they 
asked questions unrelated to their profession. The subjects 
then tossed a coin ten times. Participants were unobserved 
and reported the outcome online. For each toss, they 
could win US$20 depending on whether they reported 
heads or tails 126. The expected distribution of earnings 
if everyone behaved honestly matched perfectly with 
the distribution observed in the control group 127.  Bank 
employees, therefore, have proved to be honest under 
normal conditions.  However, a significant difference was 
observed in the group of bank employees exposed to their 
professional identity before the test. On average, they 
reported 58.2% successful coin flips, significantly above 
chance and the control group. Bank employees, therefore, 
behave unethically once they were remembered of their 
jobs prior to the task. 
Strikingly, around 8% of the bankers in the professional 
identity condition claimed the maximum earnings of 
US$200 (all heads or tails in a row), against an expected 
zero percent if everyone behaved honestly. Several bank 
employees, therefore, started to behave as pure homo eco-
nomicus once their professional identities became salient, 
leaving aside any ethical concerns 128. Cohn et al. (2014) 
summarize by saying that: Our results suggest that the 
prevailing business culture in the banking industry favors 
dishonest behavior and thus has contributed to the loss of 
the industry’s reputation. In contrast to their public image, 
however, we find that bank employees behave honestly on 
average in the control condition (p. 3) 129.
10. DETERIORATION OF LONG-TERM FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
A somewhat ironic criticism to the mantra of shareholder 
value is that, in spite of its alleged focus on maximizing 
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also observes cultural problems in the financial services industry. 
Among the 382 financial executives surveyed, 53% think that 
their career progression would be difficult without being flexi-
ble on ethical standards, while a similar proportion thinks their 
firms would be less competitive as a consequence of being too 
rigid in this area. Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. A 
Crisis of Culture: Valuing Ethics and Knowledge in the Financial 
Services. 2014.
130 Source: The Economist. Electric shock: GE breaks up.Apr 10th 
2015. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/21642356 
131 Source: The Economist. General Electric: Back to Business. Apr 
18th 2015. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/21648617
132 According to The Economist: “Its easy earnings were a form 
of corporate opium that the firm was addicted to”.
133 Source: The Economist. General Electric: Back to Business. 
Apr 18th 2015. According to the publication, since GE was not 
deemed a bank by regulators, it was allowed even thinner capital 
buffers than many lenders had.
134 Source: The Economist. General Electric: Back to Business. 
Apr 18th 2015. 
135 GE plan is to shrink its finance arm to below 10% of profits by 
2018, reducing it to the traditional role of providing credit for 
customers of GE products.
136 Source: The Economist. Electric shock: GE breaks up. Apr 10th 
2015. 
stockholder’s wealth, its adoption ends up leading to wrong 
decisions that harm its own shareholders in the long run. 
Stout (2012) provides an interesting metaphor to this 
adverse outcome called “fishing with dynamite”. Her idea 
is to demonstrate how companies can use strategies to 
unlock shareholder value to short-term investors while 
reducing aggregate stockholder wealth over the long 
term. The metaphor is based on a hypothetical statistical 
analysis aiming to relate the techniques of individual 
fishermen in a lake with the amount of fish they catch:
[What] if some fishermen start using dynamite in the lake 
and gather up all the dead fish that float to the surface 
after a blast? The statistical analysis would say that indi-
viduals who fish with dynamite catch far more fish. Then 
other fishermen would follow suit and start using this 
technique. But, over the long-run, communities that fish 
with dynamite typically see long-run declines in the average 
haul... Fishing with dynamite is a good strategy for 
an individual fisherman, for a while. But in the long run, 
it is very bad for fish and fishermen collectively (p. 50). 
Her point, therefore, is that companies that “fish with 
dynamite” may observe an initial run-up in its stock prices 
associated with poorer performance in the long-term. 
Curiously, the anecdotal evidence provided by GE, the 
historic poster boy of the shareholder value movement, 
seems to support her view. The company has suffered a 
complete restructuring after its iconic CEO Jack Welch 
took office in 1981. Willing to please the market as part 
of his priority to raise stock prices, he implemented the 
whole set of prescriptions embedded in the shareholder 
value paradigm: severe downsizing, closure or selling of 
less profitable units, carrying out of several spin-offs and 
acquisitions, providing of earnings guwidance, systematic 
meeting of quarterly earnings per shares expected by 
securities’ analysts, adoption of stock options plans as well 
as of Darwinian performance assessments, etc. 
It also went through an intense process of financialization, 
becoming more and more involved with the financial 
sector through GE Capital, its finance arm. At the end of 
Welch’s two-decade tenure, results could not seem better. 
The company’s market capitalization rose from US$14 
billion to US$470 billion in December 2000, making GE the 
most valuable company in the world. At that point, GE 
Capital obtained a return on equity of 23% and represen-
ted 41% of its profits 130. Welch was so celebrated by the 
market at that point that Fortune named him the “manager 
of the century” in 1999.
The long-term outcome of Welch’s business model (“near 
suicidal” and “a disaster waiting to happen” 131 according 
to The Economist), have only started to become clear 
afterwards. The strategic shift of the company to the 
financial industry under his command had more to do 
with opportunism than with corporate identity: GE simply 
made this move because it seemed to be an easy way to 
make money 132. The company borrowed cheaply due to its 
triple-A credit rating, becoming America’s biggest private 
issuer of short-term debt 133. GE capital assets peaked half a 
trillion dollars on the eve of the 2008 global financial crisis, 
a similar figure as of Lehman Brothers. With the eruption 
of the crisis, GE capital could not roll over around US$72 
billion of commercial paper. The firm collapsed to a point 
it had to receive a government bailout of US$60 billion in 
guarantees for its debt. In its aftermath, regulations for the 
financial sector increased, requiring more transparency 
and equity capital from the players. 
In what was considered by The Economist “a landmark in 
American capitalism” 134,  Welch’s successor, Jeffrey Immelt, 
finally announced in April 2015 that GE was going to quit 
its financial arm 135.  According to the publication, “Mr. 
Immelt has finally stamped his mark on GE, in a way that is 
damaging for the reputation of Mr. Welch” 136. 
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capacity and efficiency of its traditional business. Both 
net profits and cash flows from GE’s industrial units fell 
around 50% from 2008 to 2014. This, in turn, has led to a 
growing doubt whether its industrial businesses will be 
able to resume growth in the coming years. The Economist 
summarizes this skepticism by saying that “[By] announcing 
the closure of GE’s financial arm, Jeffrey Immelt has only 
won half of the battle to save the company” 142. 
There are no (to my knowledge) academic studies 
analyzing the long-term impact of companies that embraced 
more closely the tenets of shareholder value vis-à-vis other 
firms using large datasets and appropriate econometric 
procedures. In lack of these studies, critics tend to use 
aggregate data from broad stock indices to show that the 
rise of the shareholder value has not been followed by 
an overall improvement of stock returns for shareholders in 
general. In this sense, Stout (2012) shows that the average 
return of the S&P 500 was 7.5% per year between 1933 and 
1976 (the year of the Jensen and Meckling classic paper), 
against only 6.5% per year from 1976 to 2011, a period in 
which this dogma gained prominence in the business world. 
11. WORST LONG-TERM OUTCOMES FOR CAPITAL 
MARKETS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND UNIVERSAL 
INVESTORS
The last alleged toxic effect resulting from the shareholder 
value paradigm deals with its aggregate impact on capital 
markets, the economy and sustainability. In this case, 
critics link the rise of the ideology in the 1980s with the 
deterioration of several indicators related to these issues. 
137 In the same period, GE fell from 1st to 9th place among the 
most valuable companies, while its revenues increased slightly 
(not accounting for inflation) from US$130 billion in 2000 to 
US$144 billion in 2014. 
138 On May 31st 2015, General Electric company credit rating 
was A1 from Moodys and AA+ form Standard & Poor’s. GE Ca-
pital rating was Baa1 and A+, respectively. http://www.ge.com/
investor-relations/fixed-income-investors  
139 In August 1981, Jack Welch gave his first speech as the 
GE CEO at the hotel Pierre in New York. The speech, entitled 
“Growing fast in a slow-growth economy”, is considered the 
initial landmark of the shareholder value movement.
140 A simplified exercise shows that this was clearly not the 
case. By using the average market risk premium of 5% between 
1981 and 2015, for instance, GE’s expected return should have 
been 10.4%. In other words, GE stock returns since 1981 has been 
unsatisfactory even to be considered a fair return based on the 
standard CAPM model.
141 GE’s decisions fit perfectly in Fligstein (1990) view that 
non-financial corporations came to be increasingly seen as 
bundles of assets, rather than firm’s with product-centered 
identities.
142 Source: The Economist. Banking on de-banking. Apr 18th 
2015. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/21648681/. 
Interestingly, The Economist made several compliments to 
Welch when he retired from the company in 2000. Among 
others, the publication stated that “Such perfectionism stems 
from Jack Welch, GE's boss since 1981, who has some claim to 
being the world's most successful manager of the past quarter-
century”; “it is American firms' Welchian willingness to take 
hard decisions that has given American business its current 
pre-eminence”; and, that “It is this relentlessness that makes GE 
both so successful and so hard to copy”. Source: The Economist. 
The house that Jack built. Sep 16th 1999. Available at http://
The outcome for GE long-term stockholders since its move 
towards the shareholder value tenets may be considered 
disappointing. On May 7th 2015, its market capitalization 
was US$272 billion, 40% below its market value of US$470 
billion fifteen years before in 2000 137. It no longer boasts
its longstanding AAA credit rating 138. From August 
1981139  until May 2015, the average annual increase in GE 
market capitalization for its stockholders was a modest 
9.1%, similar to the 8.7% return of the S&P 500 index in the 
same period. In fact, it is important to note that GE beta is 
1.34, which means that it is significantly more risky than 
the broad market portfolio. As a result, a “fair return” to its 
stockholder should have been far higher than the return 
of the S&P500 index in the period 140. A simplified exercise 
shows that this was clearly not the case. Using the average 
market risk premium of 5% observed between 1981 and 
2015, for instance, GE’s expected return should have been 
10.4% according to the standard CAPM model. Thus, the GE 
stock return since 1981 was lower than it would have been 
fair for its stockholders.
The adverse consequences for GE’s shareholders resulting 
from its structural shifts under Welch’s tenure are perhaps 
even of more concern than unsatisfactory risk-adjusted 
returns. Firstly, GE’s corporate identity has been severely 
harmed. According to The Economist, 60% of its sales 
in 2001 came from business that GE no longer owns. Its 
industrial division has bought or sold companies worth 
US$100 billion in the 2000 decade, more than the capital 
currently invested in the business that remains. The 
magazine recognizes that “[This] means GE’s industrial 
businesses have not been a rock, but a constant shifting 
portfolio of assets – rather like a financial firm, in fact” 141.
Secondly, the changes seem to have reduced the innovation 
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www.economist.com/node/239557
143 The number of listed companies worldwide has fallen from 
56,119 to 46,674 during this period.
144 He notes that the decline has been even more severe for the 
IPO of small companies. In this case, the figure has dropped 
83%, from 166 IPOs per year during 1980-2000 to only 29 per 
year during 2001-2011.
145 The urgent call for a sustainable society is highlighted by 
striking figures from environmental reports such as World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) “Living Planet Report 2014”. It shows that 
more than half of the animals in the world have disappea-
red since 1970. The report also warn that human activity is 
depleting Earth’s resources by cutting down forests too quickly, 
overfishing and putting out more carbon dioxide than the 
planet can absorb. Available at https://www.worldwildlife.org/
press-releases/half-of-global-wildlife-lost-says-new-wwf-report
To begin, market characteristics associated with the 
shareholder value doctrine, such as the pressure for 
short-term returns, or the increased threat of being 
acquired or to become target of shareholder class-action 
lawsuits, may have driven away companies from stock 
markets. According to the CFA Institute, global equity 
listings declined 17% between 1998 and 2012 143. The 
figures are even more dramatic for the U.S., where stock 
exchanges lost nearly 50% of their listings from their 
peak of 9,253 in 1997.
IPO market activity also has suffered. According to Ritter 
(2013), from 1980-2000, an annual average of 310 companies 
went public in the U.S. This number has fallen to only 99 
companies in the 2001-2011 period 144. The author observes 
that the frequency of being acquired within three years 
of going public has increased over time, with the uptrend 
starting in the early 1990s. He also notes that, once a 
company is public, it is increasingly threatened by share-
holder class-action lawsuits, resulting in higher insurance 
premiums than if the company had remained private.
The reduction in IPO market activity has also had 
macroeconomic implications in terms of  employment. 
Ritter (2013) finds that the 2,766 domestic companies that 
went public in the U.S. from 1996 to 2010 added on average 
822 employees per firm since its IPOs. After calculating 
the number of jobs that would have been added to the 
economy if the number of IPOs had not dropped in the 
country, he reaches a staggering figure of 1.87 million jobs 
not “created” due to the IPO shortfall.
According to the Aspen Institute (2010), short-termism 
based on an excessive emphasis on current stock prices 
may also lead to mispricing of assets due to a lack of reliable 
information about long-term prospects. This, in turn, 
would be an additional factor leading to fewer listings 
on stock markets. Taken to a national level, the systemic 
underinvestment in R&D due to short-termism might 
affect competitiveness and economic growth. 
Masouros (2012) corroborates this view. He concludes that 
the shift in the institutional logics of corporate governance 
towards shareholder value coupled with investors’ 
increasing short-termism have cumulatively contributed 
to lower levels of capital investment by firms, economic 
stagnation, and lower GDP growth rates in five major 
Western economies: the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands, 
France, and Germany.
Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2015) provides additional evidence 
at the industry level. They investigate the consequences 
of the orientation to shareholder value by non-financial 
firms, finding that this shift has decreased total value-
added in the non-finance economy. They also find that 
the reduction in overall economic growth due to the 
financialization of the non-finance sector has been largely 
borne by labor and the state, while increasing value has 
been channeled to corporate debt and equity holders.
Another related critic is that the emergence of the 
shareholder value paradigm has contributed to a 
reduction in the lifetime of public companies. According 
to Montier (2014), for instance, the average lifespan of a 
company in the S&P 500 has been almost halved from 27 
years in 1980 to only 15 years in 2013.
In addition to these concerns, some scholars argue that 
the shareholder value idea is simply outdated for the 21st 
century because it does not consider the new imperatives 
of environmental sustainability as well as the rise of the 
universal investors.
In the first case, Sjåfjell and Mähönen (2014) and Sjåfjell et 
al. (2014) summarize the findings of a three-year project 
involving more than 40 legal scholars who mapped the 
law in 26 jurisdictions across the globe. They find that, 
although no company law system requires directors to 
pursue shareholder profit maximization at all costs, the 
social norm nowadays pressures board members to do just 
this. In their view, the focus on shareholder value constitutes 
the main barrier for companies to become sustainable 
from an environmental perspective 145. As a result, they 
conclude that corporate law around the world should be 
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146 United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI). Universal Ownership: Why environmental externa-
lities matter to institutional investors. Available at http://www.
reformed in order to clearly require boards to prioritize 
environmental sustainability over maximum returns for 
stockholders.
In the second case, the shareholder value dogma does not 
consider that an increasing proportion of investors nowadays 
are “universal” through their diversified portfolios. These 
investors are, at the same time, consumers, employees, and 
citizens from the communities impacted by the companies. 
The relation with their companies, therefore, goes far 
beyond their equity holdings: they are also stakeholders 
interested in the aggregate outcomes from listed companies 
as well as in the long-term wellbeing of society. 
Universal investors bear the costs of most of the externalities 
released by companies. According to a United Nations 
report from 2011 146,  for instance, the cost of environmental 
damage caused by the world’s 3,000 largest listed 
companies totaled US$ 2.15 trillion in 2008. Thus, the cost 
that shareholders bear due to the externalities released 
by their companies is often higher than the financial gain 
coming from them in the form of dividends and stock 
returns. In other words, ordinary people may be providing 
the capital that is being used against them by companies 
that are myopically focused on stock prices. 
12. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The business world has changed substantially since the 
early 1980s due to the popularization of shareholder 
value maximization as the main mission to be pursued by 
corporate managers. Although this shift has been more 
pronounced in the U.S. and in the U.K., the intellectual 
leadership of these countries in the management sphere 
has strongly disseminated this mantra around the world.
The empirical and theoretical literature surveyed in 
this paper shows that governing companies in order to 
maximize current stock prices lead to severe negative 
outcomes for all its constituencies, including society and 
shareholders themselves. It also adds to the literature by 
providing anecdotal evidence through short business 
cases of these side effects. 
The review of the literature provides compelling evidence 
that the quest to maximize stock prices fosters a short-term 
orientation in the governance of companies. It shows that 
the problem of short-termism derives from market pressures 
imposed on managers--e.g., such as the permanent threat 
of being acquired and the imperative to systematically meet 
expected earnings per share--as well as from
 distorted equity-based compensation systems. These 
forces lead to underinvestment as well as to the process 
of financialization of companies. The mantra of shareholder 
value maximization also incentivizes managers to make 
systematic announcements in order to signal their 
conformity with this dogma, such as downsizing, M&As 
operations and stock buybacks. The impacts of this 
paradigm are also felt in the workplace. Companies tend 
to develop an organizational culture based on internal 
competition, insecurity, fear, aggressiveness and Darwinian 
performance assessments. Corporate identity tends to 
fade, leading to lack of meaning and sense of purpose 
among employees. Ethical problems are likely to take 
place more often because executives are taught that 
their decisions should be strictly based on “economic 
logic”, which in turn leads to amoral behavior and ethical 
blindness. 
From a broader perspective, society also is affected when 
managers seek to maximize returns to shareholders at all 
costs. Rents tend to be extracted by pressuring stakeholders, 
such as employees, suppliers and communities. Companies 
are prone to hide potential liabilities as well as to not bear 
the costs of their externalities unless they are obliged to 
do so. Everyone, including future generations, tends 
to suffer the consequences of this narrow approach 
to business eventually, resulting in a big tragedy of 
commons. 
Curiously, long-term shareholders are one of the most 
impacted constituencies. As stockholders, they bear the 
consequence of the likely deterioration of their firms’ 
performance in the long run. As universal investors, they 
bear the costs of its social and environmental externalities 
as well as end up working in harsh organizational 
environments generated by this managerial paradigm. 
As citizens, they end up living in a society that largely 
reflects the quality of the decisions of these powerful 
institutions.
The limitations and adverse consequences from the 
shareholder value approach have started to be recognized 
unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/universal_ownership_full.pdf 
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148 Source: Financial Times. “Unilever warning on ‘shareholder 
value’”. 04/04/2010. Available at http://on.ft.com/1KtVijq 
149 Source: Financial Times. “Welch condemns share price focus”. 
12/03/2009. Available at http://on.ft.com/vXOXup
150The company’s interests is a concept that transcends the 
interests of shareholders by including those of other stake-
holders, such as employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, 
communities, and society. The premise for this view is that, 
although the long-term interests of the company as an entity 
and of its shareholders are congruent on most occasions, they 
may sometime diverge. 
151 In her work, Stout (2012) reviews five alternative new 
corporate theories which suggest that conventional 
shareholder primacy is counterproductive: 1) Market inefficiency 
and divide between short-term speculators and long-term 
investors; 2) Capital “lock in” and differences in shareholders’ 
demands for liquidity; 3) Team production theory and the 
problem of ex post shareholder opportunism; 4) Undiversified 
shareholders versus universal investors; and, 5) Director control 
and the interests of prosocial shareholders.
152 An important series of debates on this subject has been 
carried out by The Purpose of the Corporation Project. More in-
formation available at http://www.purposeofcorporation.org/cs
by some corporate managers. Paul Polman, CEO of Unile-
ver, illustrates the growing awareness among executives 
to adopt a broader perspective for their role by declaring 
that “[I] do not work for the shareholder, to be honest; I 
work for the consumer, the customer […] I’m not driven 
and I don’t drive this business model by driving 
shareholder value” 148.  
Even Jack Welch, the executive that for many symbolizes 
this doctrine, has recently argued that managers should 
not set share price increases as their overarching goal and 
that “[Shareholder] value is a result, not a strategy… Your 
main constituencies are your employees, your customers 
and your products... On the face of it, shareholder value is 
the dumbest idea in the world” 149. 
The view that managers should not run companies 
focusing on current stock prices, therefore, seems today 
to be increasingly accepted. However, the debate on the 
appropriate mission to be pursued by corporate managers 
is still far from settled.  Instead of “immediate” shareholder 
value, most of its former supporters are adjusting their 
discourses to “long term” shareholder value maximization. 
The more controversial debate, therefore, is whether 
shareholder primacy should still hold as the backbone for 
the corporate governance movement. If not, then a new 
and consensual platform for the role of managers should 
replace it, prioritizing above all the public interest; the 
company’s best interests 150; or the balanced interests of all 
stakeholders. For Stout (2012), for instance, it is clear that 
“shareholder primacy thinking in its conventional form is 
on the brink of intellectual collapse, and will be replaced 
by more sophisticated and nuanced theories of corporate 
structure and purpose” 151. 
Thus, the background issue related to this paper is 
whether managers’ mission is just to maximize the 
long-term economic results for stockholders or to have a 
broader accountability encompassing other stakeholders 
and society; whether managers should act as amoral 
agents within the law or if they should be expected to 
make ethical decisions; whether public companies are 
only money machines or above all social institutions. 
The ultimate debate is to revisit the purpose of the 
public company beyond shareholder value maximization 
in order to reconnect it to society152. 
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